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CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE: THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S MISSTEP AROUND 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW IN KIOBEL V. ROYAL 
DUTCH PETROLEUM CO. 
INTRODUCTION 
In Richard Wagner’s opera Lohengrin,1 a knight appears at the prayers of a 
maiden to defend her against accusations of murder.2 The knight agrees to wed 
her on the condition that she never ask his name or from whence he came.3 As 
such, when Judge Friendly called the Alien Tort Statute (“ATS”)4 a “legal 
Lohengrin,”5 he was referencing the peculiar origin and nature of this aged 
statute. Although we are well aware of the origins of the ATS, its inactivity for 
almost 200 years clouded it in an aura of mystery. Now, almost thirty years 
after its revival by the Second Circuit, that same court may have stripped the 
ATS of its ability to defend its maiden, the victims of tortious actions 
attributable to corporate entities. 
The ATS has eluded much appellate review due to settlements and quick 
dismissals. The Supreme Court has seriously considered its jurisdictional grant 
in only one case.6 As such, there remains much mystery about its exact 
function and application. By requiring that courts look to the corpus of 
international law to determine jurisdiction, the ATS opens the door to judicial 
conjecture and confusion on the content of the “law of nations.”7 Although the 
recognition of what constitutes substantive international law rules (such as 
standards for torture, extrajudicial killings, or forced exile) is a difficult enough 
task for the lower courts of the federal judiciary, the scope of those rules, such 
as their source, has equally led to conflict among the courts. 
 
 1 RICHARD WAGNER, LOHENGRIN (Nicholas John ed., Amanda Holden trans., Riverrun Press 1993) 
(1850). 
 2 See id. at 55–56. 
 3 See id. at 57–58. 
 4 Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 5 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 6 See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). The Court will review the ATS in the 2011 
Term as they have granted certiorari in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), 
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). See discussion infra Part V.D. 
 7 28 U.S.C. § 1350. 
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It is this conflict of scope that gave rise to the Second Circuit’s September 
2010 holding in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.8 The Second Circuit, 
with no briefing of the issue from the parties, reversed an assumption 
underlying many ATS decisions against corporations up to that point: that the 
ATS provided subject matter jurisdiction over actions against corporate 
entities.9 The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 
dismissed Nigerian plaintiffs’ claims alleging human rights atrocities 
committed in connection with protests over the defendant corporation’s oil 
extraction activities.10 On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed this dismissal.11 
The Second Circuit held that subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS is 
not available for actions against corporations.12 In doing so, the court almost 
exclusively looked to one source of international law—custom.13 Yet, the 
Statute for the International Court of Justice (“ICJ Statute”),14 recognized as 
the authority for the sources of international law,15 lists another important and 
especially pertinent source: “general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations.”16 As this Comment shows, the Second Circuit’s failure to implement 
this source of international law is a fatal blow to its holding. 
This Comment, in Part I, first looks to the history of the ATS and the case 
law leading up to the holding in Kiobel. Next, in Part II, the facts of this case 
are discussed, followed by an analysis of both the majority and concurring 
opinions. Part III contains a discussion of the general principles of 
international law as stated in the ICJ Statute, leading to a survey of the world’s 
legal systems in Part IV and their treatment of corporations and the imposition 
of tort liability. From this, Part V applies the general principles discovered 
from these legal systems through an analysis of the majority and concurring 
 
 8 Kiobel, 621 F.3d 111. 
 9 Id. at 145. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the question dealing with 
corporate liability under the ATS is one that goes to the merits or is jurisdictional. See Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, at i, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (No. 10-1491). This issue will be discussed more thoroughly infra Part 
V.D. 
 10 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in part, rev’d 
in part, 621 F.3d 111, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472. 
 11 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149. 
 12 Id. 
 13 Id. at 125–45. 
 14 U.N. Charter, Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031 [hereinafter 
ICJ Statute]. 
 15 DAVID J. BEDERMAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FRAMEWORKS 13 (2d ed. 2006); see also ICJ Statute, 
supra note 14, art. 38(1). 
 16 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c). 
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opinions, a look to the Second Circuit’s denial of rehearing en banc, and a 
discussion of the dual issues certified by the Supreme Court when it granted 
certiorari in Kiobel. Finally, Part VI concludes the Comment with a discussion 
of alternatives to the Second Circuit’s bright-line denial of ATS jurisdiction 
over corporations, the potential implications of the decision as it stands, and 
best alternatives to which the Second Circuit could have looked when deciding 
Kiobel. 
I. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 
Included in the Judiciary Act of 1789, the ATS states: “The district courts 
shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, 
committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”17 
Thus, plaintiffs looking to overcome the ATS’s jurisdictional barrier must be 
aliens suing in tort for a violation of the law of nations. Unlike other sources of 
original federal court jurisdiction, the ATS does not look to the relationship 
between the parties,18 nor to the source of the conflict in federal law,19 but 
asserts its power under the auspices of international law. This reference to 
international law, on its face, creates clear and unavoidable choice of law20 and 
separation of powers issues,21 among others. Additionally, there is a general 
difficulty raised when municipal courts must construe and apply international 
law. 
Despite the ATS’s potential to raise these complex issues,22 it lay relatively 
dormant for almost 200 years.23 It was awakened by the Second Circuit in 
 
 17 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006); accord Judiciary Act of 1789 § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73, 77. Some courts have also 
referred to the ATS as the Alien Tort Claims Act or the ATCA. See Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 943 
(9th Cir. 2002); Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928, at *2–3 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
The Supreme Court has used ATS, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 697 (2004), and, on this basis, this 
Comment references the statute in the same manner. 
 18 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1350, with 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2006). 
 19 Compare 28 U.S.C. § 1350, with 28 U.S.C. § 1331. 
 20 See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 286 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., concurring) 
(“Lacking the benefit of clear guidance, I presume a federal court should resort to its traditional source, the 
federal common law, when deriving the standard.”); Unocal, 395 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“I do 
not agree that the question of Unocal’s tort liability should be decided by applying any international law test at 
all. . . . [It] should be resolved by applying general federal common law tort principles.”). But see Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 126 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (noting 
that the scope of international law is defined by international law itself). 
 21 Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885–89 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 22 See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, CIVIL REMEDIES 57 (2008) [hereinafter CIVIL REMEDIES]. 
 23 See Taveras v. Taveraz, 477 F.3d 767, 771 (6th Cir. 2007). Before its revival in 1980, the ATS 
established jurisdiction in two cases, Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), and Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 
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Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,24 a decision which created a doctrine that has become 
“a touchstone for promoting effective remedies for serious human rights 
violations.”25 In Filartiga, two citizens of Paraguay brought an action to 
recover for the death of a family member by torture at the hands of a former 
Inspector General of Police.26 The trial court dismissed on jurisdictional 
grounds; the Second Circuit interpreted the trial court’s dismissal as reflecting 
that, although “official torture violates an emerging norm of customary 
international law,”27 the trial court felt “contstrained by dicta” to construe the 
ATS as excluding law governing the relations between a state and its citizens.28 
The Second Circuit disagreed. Reviving the little-used ATS, the majority 
looked to domestic court opinions,29 the UN Charter,30 the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights,31 and even municipal constitutions32 to hold that 
“official” torture is “unambiguous[ly]” and “clear[ly]” prohibited by the law of 
nations.33 
Filartiga was a groundbreaking decision and victory for human rights.34 
Since that case was decided, the ATS has substantially protected victims and 
 
F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607). In Adra, the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland resolved a 
custody dispute between divorced Iraqi and Lebanese nationals. See 195 F. Supp. at 859, 867. In Bolchos, the 
U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina, having established jurisdiction under the ATS, resolved a 
dispute between two parties over the “rightful” ownership of slaves. See 3 F. Cas. at 810–11. 
 24 See Filartiga, 630 F.2d 876. 
 25 Brief of Amici Curiae International Jurists in Support of Affirmance at 13, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 
542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004) (No. 03-339). 
 26 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878. 
 27 Id. at 880. 
 28 Id. This constraint came from the earlier Second Circuit cases of Dreyfus v. Von Finck, 534 F.2d 24 
(2d Cir. 1976), and IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 29 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–81; see also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); United States v. 
Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820). 
 30 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881–82; see also U.N. Charter arts. 55–56. 
 31 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 882; see also Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 32 Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (“[T]orture is prohibited, expressly or implicitly, by the constitutions of over 
fifty-five nations, including both the United States and Paraguay.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 33 Id. 
 34 David J. Bederman, Dead Man’s Hand: Reshuffling Foreign Sovereign Immunities in U.S. Human 
Rights Litigation, 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 255, 256 (1995/1996) (“In a sense, all current human rights 
litigation owes its fortune to Filartiga. The rediscovery of the Alien Tort Statute was much like finding the 
Holy Grail.”). Writing the opinion, Judge Kaufman recognized the enormity and impact of the decision: 
In the modern age, humanitarian and practical considerations have combined to lead the nations of 
the world to recognize that respect for fundamental human rights is in their individual and 
collective interest. . . . Our holding today . . . is a small but important step in the fulfillment of the 
ageless dream to free all people from brutal violence. 
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provided civil judgments against those who violate “sufficiently and 
constitutionally defined”35 human rights norms.36 Yet, the ATS’s reach was 
subsequently judicially limited. In Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess 
Shipping Corp.,37 the Supreme Court held that jurisdiction over foreign 
sovereigns was not secured by the ATS, but instead that the sole basis for 
jurisdiction in these cases was to be controlled by the Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities Act.38 
Notwithstanding this limitation, the use of the ATS in actions against 
private individuals has been bolstered by the courts. In Amerada Hess, the 
Supreme Court stated: “The Alien Tort Statute by its terms does not 
distinguish among classes of defendants.”39 Further, in Kadic v. Karadžić,40 the 
Second Circuit held “that certain forms of conduct violate the law of nations 
whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or only as 
private individuals.”41 Yet, in the history of ATS litigation, the concept of 
liability for the private corporate person was not confronted in such a direct 
manner as it was in Kiobel. 
The issue of corporate liability under the ATS has been pursued by 
plaintiffs under the theory of aiding and abetting liability.42 This approach has 
led to confusion and conflict in the courts over the specific standards for 
corporate aiding and abetting liability and acts as a prelude to the holding in 
Kiobel. In Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,43 “one of the most learned discussions of 
 
Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890. 
 35 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 162 (1820). 
 36 Some judgments against ATS defendants have ranged from $54 million, Arce v. Garcia, 434 F.3d 
1254, 1256 (11th Cir. 2006), to $4.5 billion, Doe I v. Karadzic, No. 93 Civ. 0878, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
12928, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
 37 Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
 38 Id. at 434. The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act’s (“FSIA’s”) jurisdiction in these cases is 
substantially limited. FSIA has statutory exceptions under which sovereign defendants could escape liability 
where the ATS would have provided it. Compare Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-
583, § 4(a), 90 Stat. 2891, 2892–94 (codified as amended as 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)–(d) (2006 & Supp. IV 
2010)), with 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 39 Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 438. 
 40 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 41 Id. at 239; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 
pt. II, intro. note, at 71 (1987) (“Individuals may be held liable for offenses against international law, such as 
piracy, war crimes, or genocide.”). 
 42 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 247 (2d Cir. 2009); 
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2007) (per curiam); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 
395 F.3d 932, 947 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 43 Unocal, 395 F.3d 932. 
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aiding and abetting liability under the ATS,”44 the Ninth Circuit judges were 
split on the definition and source of law for the aiding and abetting claims. 
Although holding that the case could continue against Unocal, the majority 
held that international law supplied the applicable legal standard,45 while Judge 
Reinhardt found the cause of action in domestic law.46 The Second Circuit 
perpetuated this conflict in Khulumani v. Barclay National Bank Ltd.47 with 
Judge Katzmann’s concurrence engaging in an analysis of international law 
tribunals and agreements to find the relevant standard,48 while Judge Hall 
argued for the application of domestic law.49 Khulumani’s remaining 
concurring opinion could be considered the direct precursor to the majority 
reasoning in Kiobel. Concluding that the scope of the ATS, as defined by 
international law,50 did not cover actions against corporate defendants,51 Judge 
Korman drew upon footnote language of the Supreme Court in Sosa v. 
Alvarez-Machain.52 
Sosa is one of a short line of cases in which the Supreme Court has given 
guidance to the lower courts handling ATS litigation. The plaintiff in Sosa was 
a Mexican physician accused of aiding in the torture of a Drug Enforcement 
Administration (“DEA”) agent.53 After failed attempts to arrest Alvarez-
Machain with the help of the Mexican government, the DEA hired a group of 
Mexican nationals to abduct and transport him to the United States to stand 
trial.54 Following termination of the criminal case, Alvarez-Machain brought a 
civil action under the ATS for arbitrary arrest and detention as a violation of 
 
 44 Anthony J. Sebok, Taking Tort Law Seriously in the Alien Tort Statute, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 871, 873 
n.20 (2008). 
 45 Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945 (“[A]ll torts alleged in the present case are jus cogens violations and, thereby, 
violations of the law of nations.”). 
 46 Id. at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (“[T]he ancillary legal question of Unocal’s third-party tort 
liability should be resolved by applying general federal common law tort principles, such as agency, joint 
venture, or reckless disregard.”). 
 47 Khulumani, 504 F.3d 254. 
 48 Id. at 270–78 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 49 Id. at 284 (Hall, J., concurring) (“To derive a standard of accessorial liability, however, a federal court 
should consult the federal common law.”). 
 50 Id. at 312 (Korman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[W]hether . . . there [is] a well 
established and universally recognized international norm providing for liability of private parties who aid and 
abet apartheid.”). 
 51 Id. at 321 (“The sources evidencing the relevant norms of international law at issue plainly do not 
recognize such liability.”). 
 52 Id. at 311; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004). 
 53 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697–98. 
 54 Id. at 698. 
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the law of nations.55 Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s en banc decision, the 
Supreme Court sought to “clarify the scope of . . . the ATS.”56 
In doing so, the Court made two key holdings. First, the Court held that the 
ATS was a jurisdictional statute that does not, of itself, create a cause of 
action.57 Although seemingly a victory for the defendant (and the United 
States, which argued the same point), the Court refused to accept the notion 
that Congress intended the ATS “to be placed on the shelf” until they enacted 
subsequent legislation creating causes of action.58 From this holding, important 
questions arise: Which causes of action for acts alleged to be violations of the 
law of nations are realized under the ATS, and thus, in the municipal law of the 
United States? How should the lower courts recognize new actions in the ever-
evolving arena of international law, if at all? 
The answers to these questions constitute the Court’s second key holding in 
Sosa.59 The Court held that to recognize a violation of the law of nations 
sufficient to trigger the ATS’s jurisdictional grant, it must “rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized.”60 Clearly, this grant gives the lower courts substantial 
discretionary power, which Justice Scalia argued in concurrence was 
“illegitimate.”61 The majority was not blind to the concern that district courts 
would be too loose in their recognition of international law norms. Justice 
Scalia argued that the “door” that leads to the creation of law under the 
auspices of a jurisdictional grant was closed by events after the enactment of 
 
 55 Id. at 698–99. 
 56 Id. at 699. 
 57 Id. at 712. 
 58 Id. at 719. 
 59 Interestingly, the holding had been alluded to in prior case law. In Filartiga, the Second Circuit 
equated the torturer with the pirate, referencing one of the three previously and sufficiently defined violations 
of international law existing when the ATS was passed, vesting federal courts with universal jurisdiction. 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980). In 1789, when the ATS was passed, Blackstone had 
already identified three defined violations of the law of nations: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the 
rights of ambassadors, and piracy. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 
(William S. Hein & Co. 1992) (1769). Also, in Amerada Hess, the Second Circuit stated in dicta, “Where the 
attacker has refused to compensate the neutral, such action is analogous to piracy, one of the earliest 
recognized violations of international law,” again referencing piracy as an established violation of the law of 
nations. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 424 (2d Cir. 1987), rev’d, 488 
U.S. 428 (1989). 
 60 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725. 
 61 Id. at 750 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia argues that the decision gives “the Federal 
Judiciary . . . a task it is neither authorized nor suited to perform.” Id. at 739. 
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the ATS (most notably, Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins62).63 Responding to 
this, the majority employed some of the most cited language in ATS litigation 
post-Sosa: “[C]onsiderations persuade us that the judicial power [to recognize 
violations of the law of nations] should be exercised on the understanding that 
the door is still ajar subject to vigilant doorkeeping, and thus open to a narrow 
class of international norms today.”64 
Sosa thus gave the lower courts the much-needed guidance to establish 
jurisdiction under the ATS. Yet, the Court also injected uncertainty in another 
area of contention in a footnote: “A related consideration is whether 
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm 
to the perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a 
corporation or individual.”65 With this, the Court created issues of whether 
international law itself defined the scope of the “law of nations”66 and whether 
that scope would stretch to cover corporations allegedly violating international 
law. The Second Circuit provided a resolution to these issues in Kiobel v. 
Royal Dutch Petroleum Co. 
II. KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO. 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
The facts of Kiobel arose from a conflict between the Ogoni people of 
Nigeria and the Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. 
(“SPDC”).67 This company is a subsidiary of and wholly owned by Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Company (“RDPC”) and Shell Transport and Trading 
Company.68 The Ogoni region consists of approximately 400 square miles in 
 
 62 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 63 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 746 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The general common law was the old door. We do not 
close that door today, for the deed was done in Erie.”); see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 78–80. 
 64 Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729. 
 65 Id. at 732 n.20 (emphasis added). 
 66 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006). 
 67 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 
(2011). 
 68 Id. 
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southern Nigeria.69 In 1956, oil was discovered in the Ogoni region and, in 
1958, SPDC began oil production in this area.70 
Since the discovery, oil and gas have become vital sources of revenue for 
Nigeria. Ninety-seven percent of Nigeria’s foreign exchange revenues and 
79.5% of government revenues come from the oil and gas sectors.71 Moreover, 
the state-owned Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation is involved in the 
“joint venture” with SPDC, owning fifty-five percent of the venture.72 Because 
of the oil extraction, the Ogoni people have watched as the region has been 
decimated and ravaged by the extraction process, oil spills,73 and gas flaring—
the act of lighting excess gas from oil wells as waste, acknowledged as 
“extremely wasteful and environmentally damaging.”74 
In 1990, the Movement for Survival of Ogoni People (“MOSOP”) was 
formed to stage nonviolent protests against SPDC operations because of the 
environmental damage.75 In 1992, MOSOP demanded compensation for the 
environmental damage and, by 1993, more than half of the Ogoni population 
participated in MOSOP protests.76 According to the allegations, SPDC enlisted 
the help of Nigerian military officials to quell the protests, and the Nigerian 
military forces attacked and looted Ogoni villages and raped and killed the 
residents.77 A month later, a Nigerian military commander wrote in a 
“restricted” memo that “Shell operations [are] still impossible unless ruthless 
military operations are undertaken for smooth economic activities to 
 
 69 See Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, Ogoni Bill of Rights 3 (Dec. 1991) (proposed bill 
of rights), available at http://www.mosop.org/Ogoni_Bill_of_Rights_1990.pdf [hereinafter Ogoni Bill of 
Rights]. 
 70 AMNESTY INT’L, NIGERIA: PETROLEUM, POLLUTION AND POVERTY IN THE NIGER DELTA 11 (2009), 
available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR44/017/2009/en/e2415061-da5c-44f8-a73c-a7a47 
66ee21d/afr440172009en.pdf. But see Ogoni Bill of Rights, supra note 69, at 4–5 (claiming that oil was not 
discovered until 1958). 
 71 AMNESTY INT’L, supra note 70, at 11. 
 72 Id. at 12. 
 73 Id. at 14–16. 
 74 Id. at 18. 
 75 See About Us, MOVEMENT FOR SURVIVAL OGONI PEOPLE, http://www.mosop.org/about_us.html (last 
visited Apr. 15, 2011). 
 76 See Ogoni Bill of Rights, supra note 69, at 3, 7 (noting that in 1991 there were approximately 500,000 
Ogoni people; demanding restitution for “the flaring of gas, oil spillages, oil blow-outs, etc.”); Events, 
MOVEMENT FOR SURVIVAL OGONI PEOPLE, http://www.mosop.org/events.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2011) 
(noting that more than 300,000 Ogoni people attended Ogoni Day on January 4, 1993). 
 77 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 
(2011). 
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commence,”78 the Ogoni plaintiffs allege that the letter announced that 
“wasting operations” would be conducted during MOSOP protests.79 The 
allegations also state that the military leader further instructed that “pressure” 
was to be exerted on Shell for “prompt regular inputs” to support military 
operations.80 
Throughout these happenings, it is alleged that Dr. Barinem Kiobel, a 
member of the Executive Council for the state encompassing Ogoni, opposed 
the use of violence in the region.81 In May 1994, he received a letter from the 
U.S. Congressional Human Rights Caucus outlining safety concerns for the 
Ogoni population and requested that Dr. Kiobel “do everything in [his] power” 
to prevent human rights violations.82 Plaintiffs allege that Kiobel forwarded the 
memo to military officials.83 Further allegations state that two weeks later, 
Kiobel was invited to attend a meeting concerning an upcoming constitutional 
convention—necessitated by the seizure of Nigerian power by General Sani 
Abacha.84 Plaintiffs allege that while Kiobel was elsewhere, taking care of 
other business, the meeting degenerated and four Ogoni elders were killed.85 
Allegations also state that Kiobel and eight other Ogoni activists, including 
MOSOP leader Ken Saro-Wiwa, were later arrested, detained, and 
subsequently tortured; these nine people came to be known as the “Ogoni 
Nine.”86 
Allegations regarding the detention state that the conditions for Dr. Kiobel 
and the rest of the Ogoni Nine were “brutal,” involving beatings and denial of 
basic medical care and food.87 Plaintiffs allege that during this time, no charges 
were filed against Dr. Kiobel.88 Allegedly, in November 1994, the Civil 
Disturbances Special Tribunal (“CDST”) was created to administer “extra-
 
 78 Id. at 189–90 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 79 Amended Class Action Complaint ¶ 59, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457 
(S.D.N.Y. 2006) (Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111, cert. granted, 132 
S. Ct. 472, reprinted in Joint Appendix at 67–68, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (No. 10-1491). 
 80 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 81 Id. ¶ 55. 
 82 Id. ¶ 60. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. ¶ 61. 
 86 See id. ¶¶ 61, 63; Karen McGregor, Ogoni Nine Hanged As Indifferent West Failed To Respond, 
INDEPENDENT (Sept. 19, 2000), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ogoni-nine-hanged-as-
indifferent-west-failed-to-respond-699325.html. 
 87 Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 79, ¶¶ 69–70. 
 88 See id. ¶ 65. 
BANKS GALLEYS PROOFS.1 6/12/2012 8:13 AM 
2012] CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 237 
judicial” sentences on those deemed to be “threats to public order.”89 Plaintiffs 
allege that this tribunal convicted Dr. Kiobel of murder and he, along with the 
rest of the Ogoni Nine, was executed after a sham trial.90 
Twelve residents of Ogoni sued RDPC, inter alia, for their complicity in 
violations of international law, alleging extrajudicial killings, torture, arbitrary 
arrest and detention, and crimes against humanity in September 2002.91 
Although concluding that aiding and abetting liability is permissible under 
Sosa, the district court held that extrajudicial killings, property destruction, 
forced exile, and violations of the rights to life, liberty, security, and 
association were not sufficiently well defined to constitute a violation of the 
law of nations, and thus, vest courts with subject matter jurisdiction under the 
ATS.92 Yet, the district court also denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss for 
aiding and abetting arbitrary arrest and detention; crimes against humanity; and 
torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.93 Recognizing that this 
case raises several controlling questions of law that provide “substantial 
ground for difference of opinion,”94 Judge Wood certified the questions 
presented for interlocutory appeal to the Second Circuit.95 
B. Majority Opinion 
Kiobel’s majority first recognized that, because appellate review of cases 
under the ATS has been uncommon,96 many issues surrounding the jurisdiction 
granted by the statute have remained unresolved.97 The issue presented here is 
one of those lacunae in ATS litigation, namely, “[d]oes the jurisdiction granted 
by the ATS extend to civil actions brought against corporations under the law 
 
 89 Id. ¶ 3. 
 90 See id. ¶¶ 3, 74. Petitioners allege multiple due process failures in the CDST trial, including detention 
without charges, interference with meetings between counsel and the accused, threats of physical violence 
against defense counsel, and provision of false testimony against the accused through bribes. See id. ¶¶ 3, 67–
69. 
 91 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 
(2011). 
 92 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 463–64, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in 
part, rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472. 
 93 Id. at 468. 
 94 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 95 Id.; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2006). 
 96 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 116–17 (“Thus, our Court has published only nine significant decisions on the 
ATS since 1980 (seven of the nine coming in the last decade), and the Supreme Court in its entire history has 
decided only one ATS case.”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712 (2004). 
 97 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 117. 
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of nations?”98 The majority answered this question in two parts. First, the court 
considered the body of law that governs the scope of ATS litigation: 
international law or domestic law.99 Concluding that international law governs 
the analysis and scope, the court then looked to the sources of international law 
to “reveal” whether corporations can be subject to liability under the statute.100 
To prove that international law governs the scope of ATS litigation, the 
majority quickly looked to the treatment of the subjects of international law.101 
Relying for the first of many times on the International Military Tribunal at 
Nuremburg (“Nuremburg Trials”)—which was definitive in stating that 
individual liability can attach for private individuals’ international law 
violations—to prove that these subjects are defined by international law itself, 
the court held that the subjects of international law were defined by 
international law.102 To further vindicate the necessity of the foregoing 
analysis, the court took guidance from footnote 20 of Sosa, where the Supreme 
Court stated that a question to be answered by the lower courts was whether 
international law extends its scope over non-state juridical entities such as 
corporations.103 The court stated that to answer this question, it has long 
followed the practice of scope-determination with reference to international 
law, beginning with the rejuvenation of ATS in Filartiga.104 To support this, 
the majority looked to Khulumani,105 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. 
Talisman Energy, Inc.,106 Kadic v. Karadžić,107 and Judge Edward’s 
concurrence in Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic.108 The majority claimed that 
this is not an unusual analysis, that “[t]here is no principled basis for treating 
 
 98 Id. at 117. 
 99 Id. at 125–31. 
 100 Id. at 131–45. 
 101 Subjects of international law are “those that, to varying extents, have legal status, personality, rights, 
and duties under international law and whose acts and relationships are the principal concerns of international 
law.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES pt. II, intro. note, at 70 
(1987) (emphasis added). 
 102 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 126–27. 
 103 Id. at 127–31; see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004). 
 104 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128 (“In Filartiga, we had looked to international law to determine our jurisdiction 
and to delineate the type of defendant who could be sued.”). 
 105 Id.; see also Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 269 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., 
concurring). 
 106 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128; see also Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 
244, 258 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 107 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128; see also Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 239–41 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 108 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128; see also Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 791–95 (D.C. Cir. 
1984) (Edwards, J., concurring). 
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the question of corporate liability differently,” and thus, this holding should be 
unsurprising.109 
The majority then moved to the second, and more controversial, holding 
that corporate liability is not sufficiently well defined to be a norm of 
international law. The court recognized the primacy of the sources of 
international law as identified in Article 38 of the ICJ Statute and reproduced 
part of Article 38.110 Attempting to delineate the norm of corporate liability in 
international law, the court separated the analysis into an investigation of 
international tribunals, international treaties, and works of publicists.111 
Curiously missing from this analysis was an investigation into “general 
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a clearly stated source of 
international law in the ICJ Statute.112 
Investigating international tribunals, the court again heavily relied on the 
Nuremburg Trials and the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of 
the Major War Criminals of the European Axis (“London Charter”)113 
establishing them as the “single most important source of modern customary 
international law concerning liability for violations of fundamental human 
rights.”114 The London Charter granted jurisdiction over “persons . . . whether 
as individuals or as members of organizations.”115 Yet, it also allowed the 
tribunal to classify organizations as criminal.116 This notion seemingly detracts 
from the court’s eventual conclusion, but the majority avoids this problem 
 
 109 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 130. 
 110 Id. at 132; see also ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38. 
 111 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132–45. The Second Circuit primarily focused on their investigation of custom. As 
for treaties, the court did indeed find treaties that would hold corporations civilly liable for international law 
violations. Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 138. The court rejected them as insufficient evidence of custom either because 
they have not been ratified by the states upon which the greatest impact would be had or because they are 
specially tuned to specific subject matter. Id. at 138 & n.40; see, e.g., Convention Against Transnational 
Organized Crime art. 10(1), done Nov. 15, 2000, T.I.A.S. 13127; Convention on Combating Bribery of 
Foreign Public Officials in International Business Transactions art. 2, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 105-43 (Dec. 17, 
1997). As for publicists, the majority and the ICJ Statute relegate them to a “subsidiary means for the 
determination of rules of law.” ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(d); accord Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 142. 
Relying on two professors who testified in front of the court, the majority concluded, “customary international 
law does not recognize liability for corporations that violate its norms.” Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 143. 
 112 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c). The court does speak to this in footnote 43. Kiobel, 621 F.3d 
at 141 n.43. A further discussion of this terse dismissal of the authority of general principles appears later in 
this Comment. See infra notes 135–43 and accompanying text. 
 113 Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, 
Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544 [hereinafter London Charter]. 
 114 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132–33. 
 115 London Charter, supra note 113, art. 6. 
 116 Id. art. 9. 
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because the authority to determine the criminality of organizations was 
“merely to facilitate the prosecution of individuals who were members of the 
organization.”117 To illustrate this point, the court recounted the treatment of 
the I.G. Farben chemical company.118 
For their complicity and active participation in the atrocities occurring at 
Auschwitz and their support of the Nazi regime, twenty-four executives of 
Farben were charged with various crimes including “planning, preparation, 
initiation and waging of wars of aggression and invasions of other countries” 
and “slavery and mass murder.”119 The corporation was not charged or named 
in the indictment. The Nuremberg Court explained in now-famous language: 
“Crimes against international law are committed by men, not by abstract 
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the 
provisions of international law be enforced.”120 
The Second Circuit moves from the Nuremberg Trials to other international 
tribunals since Nuremberg.121 They examine the jurisdictional statutes for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), and the International 
Criminal Court (“ICC”).122 Both ICTY and ICTR expressly limited jurisdiction 
to “natural persons.”123 Moreover, the court relies on negotiations during the 
creation of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (“Rome 
Statute”)124—to which the United States is not a party—that rejected proposals 
to impose corporate criminal liability.125 Thus, from their investigation of the 
 
 117 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 134 (emphasis omitted). 
 118 Id. at 134–36. 
 119 7 TRIALS OF WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE NURENBERG MILITARY TRIBUNALS 14, 50 (1953); see also 
Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135. 
 120 1 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 223 
(1947); see also Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 135. 
 121 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 136–37. 
 122 Id.; see also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 25(1), done July 17, 1998, 2187 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Annex art. 5, S.C. 
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Year, U.N. Doc. S/INF/50, at 15 (Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute]; U.N. 
Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Security Council Resolution 
808 (1993), Annex art. 6, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 3, 1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]. 
 123 ICTR Statute, supra note 122, art. 5 (“The International Tribunal for Rwanda shall have jurisdiction 
over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the present statute.”); ICTY Statute, supra note 122, art. 6 
(“The International Tribunal shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to the provisions of the 
present Statute.”). 
 124 Rome Statute, supra note 122. 
 125 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 137; see also Rome Statute, supra note 122, art. 25(1) (“The [International 
Criminal] Court shall have jurisdiction over natural persons pursuant to this Statute.”); Albin Eser, Individual 
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Nuremberg Trials and other modern international tribunals, the majority 
concluded that corporate liability has not yet been sufficiently well defined by 
these tribunals or by international law to have ripened into a norm of 
customary international law.126 Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s 
dismissal, dismissed the remaining claims, and held that “customary 
international law does not recognize liability for corporations that violate its 
norms.”127 
Before moving on to the lengthy concurring opinion, two important points 
are notable. First, the majority spends part of its introductory statements and a 
whole section of reasoning discussing its points of disagreement with the 
concurrence. During the introduction, the majority mentions that it “do[es] not 
take lightly the passion with which Judge Leval disagrees with [its] holding” 
and then proceeds to cite to every page in the concurring opinion during which 
Judge Leval calls the majority reasoning “illogical,” “strange,” and “internally 
inconsistent.”128 Then, after their primary analysis of the case, the majority 
outlines four major points of disagreement with the concurrence, consuming 
approximately three pages of its twenty-four page opinion.129 
Briefly, the majority contends that Judge Leval inappropriately shifts the 
burden to the court to find a norm of custom that justifies their ruling.130 
Contrarily, the majority says that the burden to show a custom must be on 
those attempting to invoke it.131 Second, it disagrees that a significant 
distinction exists between the imposition of criminal and civil liability in 
international law.132 Third, the majority contends that Judge Leval distorts its 
holding by stating that corporations are never liable under international law for 
violations of the law of nations.133 Finally, its disagrees that this case is 
 
Criminal Responsibility, in 1 THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 
767, 778–79 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002). 
 126 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 137. 
 127 Id. at 143. 
 128 Id. at 122. 
 129 Id. at 145–48. 
 130 Id. at 146. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. The court cites to Judge Katzmann’s concurring opinion in Khulumani: “[I]nternational law does 
not maintain [a] kind of hermetic seal between criminal and civil law.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting 
Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 270 n.5 (2d Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 133 Id. at 147. 
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“merely a question of remedy to be determined independently by each 
state.”134 
The second notable point is the majority’s treatment of general principles 
of law as a source of international law.135 In a footnote, the majority writes that 
general principles, as outlined in the ICJ Statute, are a subsidiary means of 
determining international law.136 It supports this statement by citing to the 
Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States137 and 
works of publicists.138 Further, they cite Judge Friendly in IIT v. Vencap, 
Ltd.,139 who wrote: 
We cannot subscribe to plaintiffs’ view that the Eighth 
Commandment “Thou shalt not steal” is part of the law of nations. 
While every civilized nation doubtless has this as a part of its legal 
system, a violation of the law of nations arises only when there has 
been “a violation by one or more individuals of those standards, rules 
or customs (a) affecting the relationship between states or between an 
individual and a foreign state, and (b) used by those states for their 
common good and/or in dealings inter se.”140 
This terse dismissal of general principles of law is especially curious 
considering that the majority reproduces the text of Article 38(1) of the ICJ 
Statute in full (including Subsection (c) which lists general principles as a 
source of international law),141 states that the Second Circuit has “long 
recognized” the ICJ sources as “authoritative . . . sources of international 
law,”142 and proceeds to structure their argument around custom, treaties, and 
works of publicists.143 
C. Concurring Opinion 
Judge Leval wrote the concurring opinion. Because of the opinion’s length, 
this Comment proceeds by examining Judge Leval’s five major points: (1) the 
 
 134 Id. 
 135 See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c). 
 136 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43. 
 137 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102 (1987). 
 138 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43. 
 139 Id. 
 140 IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (quoting Lopes v. Reederei Richard Schroder, 
225 F. Supp. 292, 297 (E.D. Pa. 1963)). 
 141 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 132. 
 142 Id. 
 143 See id. at 134–45. 
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creation of a rule versus the absence of a rule; (2) the question of remedy; (3) 
criminal versus civil liability in international law; (4) the potential for abuse 
told through hypothetical situations; and (5) the justification for dismissal. 
First and most important is the difference in the characterization of the 
court’s holding between the majority and the concurrence. The majority is 
explicit in saying that they looked to customary international law to “reveal” 
what it has to say about corporate liability and whether such a norm exists.144 
Conversely, the concurrence characterizes the majority holding as a new “rule” 
of international law.145 Whereas the majority views its analysis as deciphering 
the custom of nations, the concurrence characterizes it as creating a new rule 
that exempts corporations from the strictures of international law.146 This 
difference reveals a deeper conflict between the views of the majority and 
concurrence of how to apply customary international law.147 
The concurrence sees the absence of any norm imposing corporate liability 
as a grant of authority to the individual states to determine the remedy for 
violations of international norms, the second main point of the concurring 
opinion.148 According to Judge Leval, civil liability for violations of 
international norms “is awarded in U.S. courts because the law of nations has 
outlawed certain conduct, leaving it to each State to resolve questions of civil 
liability, and the United States has chosen through the ATS to impose civil 
liability.”149 
Continuing the concept that the issue of remedy is to be left to the states 
themselves, Judge Leval notes that no international tribunal exists with a 
 
 144 Id. at 125 (“[W]e consider what the sources of international law reveal with respect to whether 
corporations can be subject to liability for violations of customary international law.”). 
 145 Id. at 149 (Leval, J., concurring). Throughout the opinion and in the point headings, Judge Leval refers 
to the “rule” of the majority. 
 146 Id. at 151 (“The corporation, according to my colleagues, has not violated international law, and is 
indeed incapable of doing so because international law does not apply to the conduct of corporations.”). 
 147 The majority reasoned that the absence of any norm that supports corporate liability is the exact proof 
that no such norm exists and, thus, no subject matter jurisdiction can be maintained under the law of nations 
and the ATS. Id. at 147 (majority opinion) (“We hold that corporate liability is not a norm that we can 
recognize and apply in actions under the ATS because the customary international law of human rights does 
not impose any form of liability on corporations (civil, criminal, or otherwise).”). 
 148 Id. at 152 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 149 Id. at 175. Moreover, if international law were to have a rule exempting corporations from liability (as 
the concurrence characterizes the majority holding), that rule would have to be found in customary 
international law and be sufficiently well defined. See id. at 164. 
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structure to carry the jurisdiction consistent with the majority’s rule.150 No 
international tribunal “has ever had jurisdiction to consider a private civil 
remedy of any kind—either against a natural person or a juridical entity.”151 
Moreover, if the remedy for violations of international law is not to be decided 
by the states, then it follows that international law does not recognize liability 
for natural persons either. The conclusion that no custom recognizes civil 
corporate liability merely follows from the idea that there is “no rule of 
international law making any private person civilly liable . . . . If the absence of 
widespread agreement in the world as to civil liability bars imposing liability 
on corporations, it bars imposing liability on natural persons as well.”152 
The third major point of the concurring opinion is the distinction between 
criminal and civil liability in international law. Judge Leval points out that the 
majority mostly relied on the jurisdictional grants of international criminal 
tribunals to justify their conclusion that corporate liability is not a cognizable 
customary norm.153 The majority is correct that the international tribunals to 
which they looked limited their jurisdiction to natural persons.154 Yet, the 
concurrence sees this as a function of the differing purposes between civil and 
criminal liability and not as a function of the international community’s denial 
of corporate civil liability for violations of international law.155 
This denial of criminal liability does not imply the denial of civil liability 
upon juridical entities.156 Unlike the purposes of criminal liability, the purposes 
of civil liability can be effectuated by holding corporations financially 
responsible for their torts.157 Civil liability’s “principal objective” is to 
compensate victims and restore them to their previous condition before the 
 
 150 Id. at 160 n.11; see also H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW § 126, at 266 (Archon Books 1970) (1927) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW] 
(“International jurisprudence is rough when there is no forum . . . before which to fight out its problems.”). 
 151 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 163 (Leval, J., concurring). This argument is reminiscent of the views of Judge 
Reinhardt in Unocal and Judge Hall in Khulumani that the controlling law for violations of the law of nations 
is the common law. See Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 284 (2d Cir. 2007) (Hall, J., 
concurring); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 965 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring). 
 152 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 176 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 153 Id. at 166 (“The only fact of international law to which the majority can point as evidence of its view 
that international law does not apply to juridical persons is the fact that international criminal tribunals have 
not exercised authority to impose criminal punishments on them.”). 
 154 See Rome Statute, supra note 122, art. 25(1); ICTR Statute, supra note 122, art. 5; ICTY Statute, supra 
note 122, art. 6. 
 155 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 152 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 156 Id. at 168 (“The refusal of international organizations to impose criminal liability of 
corporations . . . in no way implies that international law deems corporations exempt from international law.”). 
 157 Id. at 169. 
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tortious damage.158 Additionally, this can be satisfactorily done only if the 
liability is on the corporation, instead of the executives, because the corporate 
entity earned the profit resulting from the illicit activities.159 
Fourth, Judge Leval, from the outset, looks to the slippery slope to exhibit 
the potential for abuse the majority holding could yield: 
So long as they incorporate (or act in the form of a trust), businesses 
will now be free to trade in or exploit slaves, employ mercenary 
armies to do dirty work for despots, perform genocides or operate 
torture prisons for a despot’s political opponents, or engage in 
piracy—all without civil liability to victims.160 
He continues this analysis by providing hypothetical situations in which 
corporations could perpetrate gross and heinous violations of human rights in 
the area of slave trading (with an emphasis on sex-slavery), piracy, genocide, 
and the aiding and abetting of these violations.161 
Fifth and final, despite the lengthy reasoning of the concurring opinion 
mostly discussing its divergence from the views of the majority, Judge Leval 
agrees that the claims in this case should be dismissed. In doing so, he 
combined the purposeful standard for aiding and abetting liability as stated in 
Talisman162—and also by Judge Katzmann in Khulumani163—with the modern 
pleading standard handed down in Ashcroft v. Iqbal.164 He then reviewed the 
sufficiency of the pleadings for both SPDC and RDPC’s direct violations of 
human rights and its complicity in those violations under the aiding and 
abetting standard.165 
It is important to note the complete lack of mention in the concurring 
opinion of “general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”166 
 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. Judge Leval notes in the same paragraph, “[I]t is the worldwide practice to impose civil liability on 
corporations.” Id. Yet, nowhere in the concurring opinion are general principles as stated in the ICJ Statute 
discussed. 
 160 Id. at 150. 
 161 Id. at 155–60. The majority dismisses these “hypothetical cases,” by merely reiterating their contention 
that although corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS, those individual perpetrators responsible for 
the corporate violation can. Id. at 147–48 (majority opinion). 
 162 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 163 Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 277 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 164 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009); see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) 
(originating the plausibility pleading standard under Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
 165 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 188–96 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 166 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c). 
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Whereas the majority simply dismisses them as a subsidiary source of 
international law and turns only to custom to resolve the issues in this case,167 
the concurrence ignores them altogether and relies on domestic law principles 
to rebut the majority holding that the ATS provides no subject matter 
jurisdiction over corporate defendants. This Comment proceeds by defining 
and discussing this recognized source of international law.  
III. GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The present version of Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute recognizes 
“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations” as a source of 
international law along with custom, convention, and the works of scholars.168 
This clause has its origin in the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (“PCIJ Statute”), Article 38(3).169 It was first proposed by Baron 
Descamps, the Chairman of the Advisory Committee of Jurists.170 Draft 
schemes from various countries phrased the intended source slightly 
differently: “general principles of law” (Denmark, Norway, and Sweden), 
“general principles of law and equity” (Germany and Brazil’s Clovis 
Bevilaqua), “general principles of justice and equity” (Switzerland), and “rules 
which, in the considered opinion of the Court, should be the rules of 
international law” (alternative draft for Norway, Denmark, and Sweden and the 
draft scheme of the Five Neutral Powers).171 The eventually adopted text was 
proposed by Elihu Root, a U.S. statesman, although it is more commonly 
attributed to his collaborator, Lord Phillimore.172 
Regardless of the exact phrasing, the inclusion of “general principles of 
law” was nothing new to the countries drafting the statute. The phrase was a 
common one and codified in many municipal law systems.173 This rejection—
inherent in the omission of international general principles from the statute—of 
 
 167 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 141 n.43. 
 168 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1). 
 169 Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice art. 38(3), 1926 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1, at 7 
[hereinafter PCIJ Statute]. The PCIJ Statute did not use the numbering system currently employed in the ICJ 
Statute, but instead the PCIJ Statute numbered subparagraphs with Arabic numerals, but did not number 
paragraphs. See BIN CHENG, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AS APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND 
TRIBUNALS 2 n.4 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2006) (1953). 
 170 CHENG, supra note 169, at 7. 
 171 Id. at 7 & nn.24–27 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 172 Id. at 14–15. 
 173 Id. at 19. The nations of three of the ten members who drafted the PCIJ Statute contained the “general 
principles of law” in their municipal laws. Id. 
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traditional international law sources recognized that the international legal 
system is significantly less developed than most municipal legal systems; thus, 
there will be lacunae where custom and treaty have not developed.174 The 
insertion of general principles in the PCIJ Statute “was intended to provide a 
solution in cases where treaties and custom provided no (clear) answers to the 
case at hand.”175 By doing so, the ICJ could prevent a plea of non liquet—
dismissal on the basis of no controlling law.176 Moreover, general principles 
will continue to serve important functions in less developed areas of 
international law—such as human rights—to resolve issues “which neither 
conventional nor customary law is ready to meet.”177 
Yet, what exactly are “general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations”?178 Scholars have provided varying definitions such as “a core of legal 
ideas which are common to all civilized legal systems”;179 “principles which 
are so fundamental to every well-ordered society that no reasonable form of 
co-existence is possible without their being generally recognized as valid”;180 
and “norms underlying national legal orders . . . the manifestation of the 
universal legal conscience certified by the law of civilized States.”181 The 
consensus that emerges from these definitions is a recognition of “the existence 
of a common core of objectively identifiable legal principles.”182 Some typical 
general principles that have been recognized in international tribunals are those 
such as estoppel,183 unjust enrichment,184 necessity,185 and proximate cause.186 
 
 174 See BEDERMAN, supra note 15, at 14. 
 175 Erika de Wet, Judicial Review as an Emerging General Principle of Law and Its Implications for the 
International Court of Justice, 47 NETH. INT’L L. REV. 181, 185–86 (2000). 
 176 H.C. Gutteridge, The Meaning and Scope of Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, 38 TRANSACTIONS GROTIUS SOC’Y 125, 125 (1952). 
 177 M. Cherif Bassiouni, A Functional Approach to “General Principles of International Law,” 11 MICH. 
J. INT’L L. 768, 769 (1990). 
 178 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c). 
 179 Rudolf B. Schlesinger, Research on the General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, 
51 AM. J. INT’L L. 734, 739 (1957). 
 180 1 J.H. W. VERZIJL, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 59 (1968). 
 181 Johan G. Lammers, General Principles of Law Recognized by Civilized Nations, in ESSAYS ON THE 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER 53, 57 (Frits Kalshoven et al. eds., 1980) (quoting and 
translating A. FAVRE, PRINCIPES DU DROIT DES GENS [PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW] 275 (1974)) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
 182 Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 771. 
 183 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13). 
 184 Lena Goldfields, Ltd., Arbitration (Sept. 3, 1930), as reprinted in Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration 
Between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31, 42–53. 
 185 S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Ger.), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 (Aug. 17). 
 186 Administrative Decision No. II (U.S. v. Ger.), 7 R.I.A.A. 23, 29 (U.S.–Ger. Mixed Cl. Comm’n 1939). 
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These principles can be derived from both national and international 
sources.187 
Before proceeding to examine examples and applications of general 
principles as seen in international tribunals, there is another area of ambiguity 
that should be addressed, namely, the difference between custom and general 
principles. Neither is a superior source to the other according to both the plain 
text of the ICJ Statute and the drafting history.188 The line of demarcation 
between the two is unclear because both include “all that is unwritten in 
international law.”189 
A rule of customary international law is shown by proving that (1) the rule 
has been followed as a “general practice” and (2) opinio juris.190 The first is 
exhibited by actual practices of states inter se and is an objective inquiry, while 
the second, opinio juris, is a subjective element and looks to why international 
actors act according to the proposed custom.191 This second element is satisfied 
by showing that states act according to the custom out of a “sense of legal 
obligation or necessity.”192 
In contrast, showing a general principle requires “recognition,” but has no 
requirement of practice.193 This requirement of recognition makes the search 
for and eventual use of a general principle more objective.194 Moreover, 
general principles express a general truth that should guide action and be a 
 
 187 Regardless of their source, the underlying theoretical basis of the use of general principles raises issues 
of natural law versus positivism. Although a thorough investigation of the theoretical and philosophical 
underpinnings of the use of general principles is outside the scope of this discussion, Professor Bassiouni 
provides a short summary: 
[T]here is reason to believe that the framers of the PCIJ’s article 38 (I)(3) and the ICJ’s article 
38 (1)(c) may have accepted the notion that natural law may be separate from the naturalists’ 
understanding of that term, and that it may arise from concrete applications and common practices 
existing in and among “civilized nations.” Such a composite conception may be viewed as a 
compromise between positivism and naturalism, if that is at all possible. 
Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 774 (footnote omitted). 
 188 CHENG, supra note 169, at 20 (“[D]uring the discussion in the Committees of the First Assembly, the 
words ‘in the order following’ (‘en ordre successif’) in the introductory phrase of the draft article were 
deleted.”). 
 189 Id. at 23. 
 190 BEDERMAN, supra note 15, at 16. 
 191 Id. at 16–17. 
 192 Id. at 17. 
 193 CHENG, supra note 169, at 24. 
 194 De Wet, supra note 175, at 186. This objectivity emerges from the omission of an opinio juris-type 
element that looks to the subjective reasons why states adhere to a custom. 
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“theoretical basis” for solutions, while the rules of custom are practical and 
binding.195 Additionally, as previously mentioned, custom is limited in its 
sources to international law and the practices of states among each other, while 
general principles can be derived from domestic and international law. The 
subtlety of these differences is a function of international tribunals’ failure to 
clearly demarcate the two sources and reluctance to decide cases on the basis 
of general principles.196 
An advocate attempting to use or rely upon general principles has a 
difficult task. Both the PCIJ and ICJ have failed to explain the method by 
which a general principle will be recognized by the court.197 Adding to the lack 
of a methodology, the use of general principles suffers from a “paradox” 
relating to the generality of the principle.198 Because the principle will be 
evidenced by widespread recognition in the international community’s various 
legal systems, the more abstract the principle is, the easier its mass recognition 
is to prove.199 Yet, the more abstract the principle, the less useful it is in 
solving legal disputes in international tribunals.200 Nevertheless, Professor 
Lauterpacht has recognized that “international tribunals apply [municipal] law 
whenever they deem it advisable; that States which are parties before an 
international tribunal have, as a rule, recourse to analogies of private law,” at 
least in the context of international arbitral tribunals.201 
Despite these barriers, some guidelines have been espoused by the courts 
and can be found in the writings of academics. In AM & S Europe Ltd. v. 
Commission of the European Communities (“AM & S Case”),202 the European 
Court of Justice looked to general principles of the European Community to 
 
 195 CHENG, supra note 169, at 24 (quoting and translating Gentini Case (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 551, 
556 (It.–Venez. Mixed Cl. Comm’n 1903)). 
 196 Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 791; see also Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), 
1960 I.C.J. 6, 43 (Apr. 12); HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE 
INTERNATIONAL COURT § 51, at 166 (1958) [hereinafter LAUTERPACHT, DEVELOPMENT] (“Experience has 
shown that the main function of ‘general principles of law’ has been that of a safety-valve to be kept in reserve 
rather than a source of law of frequent application.”). In this case, the ICJ specifically refused to determine 
whether the issue could be resolved by general principles, but instead relied on a practice and local custom. 
Right of Passage over Indian Territory, 1960 I.C.J. at 43. 
 197 Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 796. 
 198 BEDERMAN, supra note 15, at 14–15. 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 150, § 126, at 267. 
 202 Case 155/79, AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1982 E.C.R. 1575. 
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decipher a rule on legal confidentiality.203 The court surveyed the Member 
States’ municipal law and presented each state’s view on the confidentiality of 
documents between counsel and client.204 The court sought to derive a general 
principle of European Community law to cover these communications.205 
Although finding that this privilege was not identically stated in all the 
Member States, it was sufficient that some states recognize the confidentiality 
“inasmuch as it contributes toward the maintenance of the rule of law” while 
others recognize that “the rights of the defence must be respected.”206 This 
principle arises from “the purpose[] and in the interest[] of the client’s rights of 
defence.”207 
In the Delagoa Railway Arbitration, the tribunal based an award from 
Portugal to the United States and Great Britain resulting from the Portuguese 
government’s seizure of a railroad on “the general principles of the common 
law of modern nations.”208 Doing so, the tribunal upheld the general principles 
of compensation for damnum emergens (“material damage”) and lucrum 
cessans (“loss of profit”).209 In the Cayuga Indians Claims Case,210 the 
international arbitral tribunal looked to “considerations of justice, equity, and 
right dealing” and adopted a corporate veil-piercing analogy to hold that the 
Cayuga Indians were entitled to annuity shares under the Treaty of Ghent of 
1814, inter alia.211 
Yet, when investigating whether the international community of nations 
recognizes a general principle, instead of merely European Community parties 
as in the AM & S Case, the ease of identifying a unique principle is more 
difficult. Three primary issues arise. First is the question of how many nations 
must accept or evidence the general principle for it to be recognized. The ICJ 
has rejected the notion of universal acceptance—the idea that it must be 
evidenced by all nations.212 Thus, the principle should be evidenced by a 
 
 203 Id. at 1610–13. 
 204 Id. at 1605–06. 
 205 See id. 
 206 Id. at 1610–11. 
 207 Id. at 1611. 
 208 LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 150, § 128, at 271 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
 209 Id. § 128, at 270–73. 
 210 Great Britain ex rel. Cayuga Indians v. United States, 6 R.I.A.A. 173 (Am.–British Cl. Arb. Trib. 
1926). 
 211 Id. at 180, 189. 
 212 BEDERMAN, supra note 15, at 18. 
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“representative majority” of nations, which includes the “principal” legal 
systems of the world.213  
Second is the question of how uniform the recognition of a general 
principle must be for its utilization. In the AM & S Case, the Advocate General 
argued that the principle does not have to be identically expressed or followed 
in the European Community countries to be a recognized principle.214 Still, an 
advocate must remember the paradox discussed earlier: the more countries, the 
greater recognition, but also the less specific and useful the principle becomes. 
A good example is the Gentini Case215 in which the Venezuelan Mixed Claims 
Commission unquestionably recognized a principle of prescription—statutes of 
limitations and repose—although it did not exactly set a numerical standard.216 
The third question arising in an investigation to prove a general principle 
arises from which countries must recognize the principle. The ICJ Statute says 
that the general principles are those recognized by “civilized” nations.217 The 
idea of “civilized” nations has been criticized and generally rejected as a 
legitimate limitation on the use of general principles.218 Instead, the reference 
to civilized nations refers to the major legal systems of the world, including the 
common law tradition, civil law tradition, significant religious legal systems, 
and other ideological legal systems (including socialist law).219 
It is this general outline of the world’s significant legal systems that guides 
the following discussion of corporate tort liability before returning to Kiobel 
and applying the general principle to those facts. Generally, the discussion 
looks to the laws of nations to prove that corporate tort liability is an 
established and recognized principle in the major legal systems of the world. 
Underlying this concept is the general principle of responsibility. In Factory at 
Chorzów, the PCIJ stated that “it is a principle of international law, and even a 
general conception of law, that any breach of an engagement involves an 
 
 213 De Wet, supra note 175, at 187. 
 214 Case 155/79, AM & S Eur. Ltd. v. Comm’n of the European Cmtys., 1982 E.C.R. 1575, 1650 (opinion 
of Advocate General Sir Gordon Slynn). 
 215 Gentini Case (It. v. Venez.), 10 R.I.A.A. 551 (It.–Venez. Mixed Cl. Comm’n 1903). 
 216 Id. at 556. 
 217 ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1)(c). 
 218 Gutteridge, supra note 176, at 130–31. 
 219 BEDERMAN, supra note 15, at 14. Because of the controversy surrounding whether socialist law 
actually constitutes a separate and independent legal system in contemporary legal practice, its norms 
concerning corporate liability are not examined. For a thorough discussion of this controversy, see John 
Quigley, Socialist Law and the Civil Law Tradition, 37 AM. J. COMP. L. 781 (1989). 
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obligation to make reparation.”220 This principle was also evidenced in a 
Central American Court of Justice decision that provided “the complete 
analogy between public and private law” when turning to a principle of 
international responsibility on the basis of the private law conception of 
fault.221 Thus, while looking to the text of municipal law systems to discover a 
general principle of corporate tort liability, underlying most of the rationales 
will be the general principle of responsibility. 
IV.  IMPOSITION OF CORPORATE TORT LIABILITY 
A. Civil Versus Criminal 
Before examining the world’s legal systems for principles of corporate civil 
tort liability, an initial decision between civil and criminal liability must be 
justified. This is not a trivial distinction. The majority’s reliance on 
international—and primarily customary—criminal law in Kiobel was a major 
dividing point between the majority and the stinging concurrence.222 
The doctrine of corporate criminal liability was an accepted idea before the 
French Revolution when its acceptance declined with the rise of the ideal of 
individualism.223 The growing industrialization of the world’s economies 
began to see courts struggling against the conceptual barriers against corporate 
criminal liability. These arguments were similar in both the United States and 
the United Kingdom and had three general points of contention. First, because 
a corporation is a legal fiction, it is limited to actions for which it is legally 
empowered—also known as the ultra vires rule.224 Second, corporations were 
not contemplated to be able to have the requisite mens rea for perpetration of 
criminal acts.225 Third, sanctioning difficulties arose: corporations cannot be 
 
 220 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at 29 (Sept. 13); see also Corfu 
Channel (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 23 (finding that Albania was “responsible” for injury and had “a 
duty . . . to pay compensation”). For an excellent discussion of the general principle of responsibility, see 
CHENG, supra note 169, 163–70. 
 221 LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW, supra note 150, § 135, at 287 (quoting Editorial, 3 AM. J. INT’L L. 423, 
436 (1909)). 
 222 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 120–23 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. 
Ct. 472 (2011). 
 223 Guy Stessens, Corporate Criminal Liability: A Comparative Perspective, 43 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 493, 
494 (1994). 
 224 Id. at 495. 
 225 Id. 
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imprisoned or—as was the typical punishment for felonies in English courts—
executed or deported.226 
Today, the ultra vires rule has eroded in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.227 Three cases in the United Kingdom and a landmark U.S. Supreme 
Court case have also overcome the hesitation of courts to impute mens rea to 
the corporation through doctrines of vicarious liability.228 Canada overcame 
this argument with strict and absolute liability regimes.229 The sanctioning 
difficulties were resolved by the imposition of fines and other sanctions such 
as loss of license, probation, or debarment—the loss of government 
contracts.230 The French Penal Code allows for corporations to be fined up to 
five times the maximum for individuals, while the Dutch Penal Code provides 
that any criminal sanction applicable to an individual can be applied to a 
corporation, except for those which cannot be (e.g., imprisonment).231 
The currently problematic issue arising from international prosecution of 
legal entities such as corporations is that no international tribunal has the 
jurisdiction to adjudicate legal entities; their jurisdiction only extends to 
natural persons.232 Although there is no “theoretical obstacle” to holding 
corporations liable for violations of international law,233 negotiations to include 
legal entities as subjects of adjudication for the International Criminal Court 
failed in the formation of the Rome Statute.234 Thus, this form of liability is 
generally available only in national legal systems. 
Comparatively, the use of civil remedies provides two primary advantages 
over the criminal system. First, the claims can be initiated by the victims 
against which the crimes were perpetrated or their survivors.235 The advantage 
 
 226 Id. 
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 233 Id. 
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 235 See CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 22, at 4. 
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here bypasses the need to involve possibly reluctant municipal authorities to 
initiate the suit.236 Second, following from this and the general principle of 
responsibility,237 the victims of human rights abuses can be paid damages 
directly.238 Moreover, and particularly relevant here, civil tort liability to 
compensate victims for damages is a longstanding principle in most nations, 
while corporate criminal liability is still developing. Because of this long 
tradition of domestic corporate liability and its worldwide acceptance, it was 
erroneous for the Second Circuit to use vacuums in international criminal law 
to justify their rejection of the civil litigation mechanism and the principle 
revealed by an investigation into the general principles of law seen around the 
world. 
B. Common Law Jurisdictions 
The common law jurisdictions handle issues of civil liability through the 
law of torts.239 Tort law allows compensation to subjects of injury for protected 
“interests” such as life, liberty, and property.240 According to William L. 
Prosser, tort law serves five primary functions: 
(1) to provide a peaceful means for adjusting the rights of parties who 
might otherwise “take the law into their own hands”; (2) to deter 
wrongful conduct; (3) to encourage socially responsible behavior; (4) 
to restore injured parties to their original condition . . . by 
compensating them for their injury; and (5) to vindicate individual 
rights of redress.241 
Without even looking to the domestic law of tort in the common law 
countries, holding corporations accountable for their torts furthers all five of 
these goals, specifically in the context of the Kiobel facts, by deterring 
vigilantism against the corporate entity while simultaneously deterring the use 
of illegitimate means to quell protesting parties and instead promoting 
 
 236 See id. 
 237 Eric Mongelard, Corporate Civil Liability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law, 88 INT’L 
REV. RED CROSS 665, 667 (2006). 
 238 CIVIL REMEDIES, supra note 22, at 5 (“[T]he law of civil remedies may often provide victims with 
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responsible means to solutions to restore those suffering injury to the status 
quo and vindicating their rights of redress. 
The corporation can incur tort liability in two ways: directly and 
vicariously.242 Vicarious corporate liability is a form of strict liability regime 
wherein the principal is absolutely liable for the torts of an agent as if it were 
the tortious actor itself.243 Yet, this investigation merely seeks to decipher a 
general principle that corporations are held civilly liable for their torts. 
Kiobel’s holding is that international law has not sufficiently defined corporate 
liability to be a cognizable customary norm such that U.S. courts would have 
subject matter jurisdiction under the ATS.244 Thus, regardless of the doctrinal 
mechanism through which liability is imposed on the corporate entity, the mere 
fact that liability is imposed is sufficient for this investigation. 
In the United Kingdom, the first real mention of vicarious liability in the 
sense of an employer’s liability for harm caused by the employee while acting 
in the scope of his employment is Hern v. Nichols245 in 1709.246 In this case, an 
agent fraudulently represented the quality of silk he was selling.247 The 
purchaser brought an action for deceit and the court held that the employer 
should be liable civilly because he put “a trust and confidence” in the 
deceiving employee.248 Although deceit can be considered an intentional tort, 
vicarious liability traditionally did not cover intentional torts under 
interpretations of the United Kingdom’s controlling Salmond test.249 This 
recently changed in the United Kingdom in Lister v. Hesley Hall Limited,250 
which held an employer vicariously liable for torts arising out of the sexual 
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assault of emotionally and behaviorally problematic boys by the warden of 
their boarding annex.251 
In the Lister opinion, Lord Steyn commented favorably on two recent cases 
by the Canadian Supreme Court in this area of vicarious liability for intentional 
torts.252 In one of these cases, the Canadian Supreme Court explicitly 
referenced the use of the Salmond test, as evidence of vicarious liability’s 
similar growth and application in Canada, borrowing from U.K. common 
law.253 In this case, the court held a non-profit organization liable for torts 
arising from the sexual assault of children by a caretaker at a residential child-
care facility.254 Moreover, both Canada and the United Kingdom have stated 
that to the extent that violations of international human rights laws give rise to 
injuries cognizable as torts (such as assault, battery, false imprisonment), civil 
remedies would be available.255 It seems to follow that if courts are 
comfortable holding corporations and non-profits liable for sexual abuse 
injuries inflicted by those under their control, then relief should be available 
for providing funding for atrociously violent human rights violations. 
The idea of vicarious liability for intentional torts is also seen in U.S. 
jurisprudence. Respondeat superior is not limited to negligence, but also 
extends to “willful and malicious torts of an employee.”256 Moreover, the 
United States stands at the forefront of civil protection for the rights of 
plaintiffs injured by breaches of international law because of the ATS itself. 
Before the holding in Kiobel, it was presumed that corporations could be held 
liable for these torts under the aiding and abetting theory, making the United 
States a leader in corporate tort liability.257 
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Finally, in Australia, employers are vicariously liable for intentional torts 
committed in the course of employment.258 Again, citations to and use of the 
Salmond test appear in the High Court of Australia’s opinion in New South 
Wales v. Lapore.259 In this case, Judge Kirby wrote that the fact that the torts 
were intentional was not a bar to vicarious liability and cited with approval the 
Canadian and English cases discussed above.260 
Thus, as can be seen from the above analysis of major common law 
systems, the concept of liability for the corporate employer is not foreign in the 
less egregious realm of negligence or in the field of intentional torts. 
Therefore, the common law clearly recognizes a principle of law that holds 
corporations liable for tortious conduct committed in furtherance of their 
interests. 
C. Civil Law Jurisdictions 
The civil law tradition traces its existence from ancient Rome and is the 
most prominent legal system in the world.261 Although controlled by a large 
body of statutory law, a de facto system of precedent deriving from 
interpretations of the statutes has begun to develop and has become especially 
important in the French law of delicts whose treatment in the Code Civil is 
quite general.262 As well as the developing reliance on judicial rulings between 
the civil and common law systems, similarities in vicarious liability exist. The 
solutions given by the civil law jurisdictions and the common law jurisdictions 
are similar.263 
Looking at many civil codes, their general treatment of corporations and 
liability for torts follow similar patterns: early provisions give the corporation 
some sense of legal personality such that it is given rights and incurs 
obligations, and later provisions provide for principles of reparation for 
tortious harm committed by those with legal personality.264 Although this 
pattern is not uniform, it is the general treatment pertinent to this discussion. 
 
 258 See New South Wales v. Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511, 547 (H.C.) (Austl.) (opinion of Gleeson, C.J.). 
 259 Id. at 511. 
 260 Id. at 603–04, 623. 
 261 JAMES G. APPLE & ROBERT P. DEYLING, A PRIMER ON THE CIVIL-LAW SYSTEM 3 (1995), available at 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/civillaw.pdf/$file/civillaw.pdf. 
 262 Id. at 31. 
 263 Kwame Opoku, Delictual Liability in German Law, 21 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 230, 230 (1972). 
 264 See, e.g., BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, REICHSGESETZBLATT 
[RGBL.] 195, as amended, §§ 21–22, 823, 831 (Ger.). 
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The French civil code, which Napoleon considered his greatest 
achievement and has influenced countless other civil codes worldwide,265 has a 
quite broad treatment of torts. Article 1382 states that any act that causes 
damage to the other creates an obligation to compensate the victim by the 
person at fault.266 Article 1384 codifies vicarious liability by stating that a 
person is also liable for damages caused by those for whom he is 
responsible.267 The French civil system is highly influential and has been 
adopted, either in part or in whole, in many countries including Belgium, the 
Netherlands, and Egypt.268 
The German civil code has also been highly influential amongst the world’s 
civil law systems.269 Sections 21 and 22 provide for the legal personality of 
associations.270 Section 823 imposes liability for intentional or negligent injury 
of life, body, health, freedom, property, or another right.271 The liability for 
vicarious agents is outlined in Section 831 for those “who use another person 
to perform a task” when that person unlawfully inflicts damage while “carrying 
out the task.”272 The principal can be exculpated from this liability if 
reasonable care was taken in selecting the agent causing the tortious injury.273 
Japan’s civil code is more straightforward in its treatment of the liability for 
legal persons. Article 44 provides that a juridical person will be liable for 
damage to others caused either by its directors or other agents while 
performing their duties for the corporation.274 
The civil code in Russia is written with extraordinary clarity. Like the 
German code, Articles 48 and 49 provide for the concept and legal capacity of 
the legal entity, which the Russian code defines as an organization that has its 
own “set-apart property and . . . is answerable by its obligations with this 
 
 265 APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 14 n.5. 
 266 CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1382 (Fr.). 
 267 Id. art. 1384. 
 268 R. W. Lee, The Civil Law and the Common Law—A World Survey, 14 MICH. L. REV. 89, 92–94 
(1915). 
 269  APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 1. 
 270 BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], Aug. 18, 1896, REICHSGESETZBLATT [RGBL.] 195, 
as amended, §§ 21–22 (Ger.). 
 271 Id. § 823, para. 1. 
 272 Id. § 831, para. 1, English translation available at http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_bgb/ 
englisch_bgb.html. 
 273 Id. 
 274 MINPŌ [MINPŌ] [CIV. C.] art. 44, para. 1 (Japan). 
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property.”275 Article 1068 provides that a “legal entity . . . shall redress the 
injury inflicted by the employee” as well as for the liability of “[e]conomic 
partnerships and procedure cooperatives” when injury is inflicted by its 
“participants (members).”276 
In Norway, business entities domestically domiciled can have both civil 
and criminal actions brought against it for actions committed within and 
outside of the country.277 Compensation is available for “personal bodily 
injury, loss of future income and for the assumed future expenses that will be 
debited to the harmed person,” and if the victim is harmed in a “lastingly and 
considerable way,” they are entitled to compensation for that injury.278 
The Spanish civil law was responsible for the spread of civil law in Central 
and South America.279 Article 35 of the Código Civil280 classifies corporations 
as juridical persons whose personality begins from the moment they are validly 
constituted and states that associations of private interest are granted individual 
personality independent from that of each of its members.281 Article 1902 
generally imposes liability for tortious injury while Article 1903 states that this 
recompense for damage is demandable from those of persons for whom others 
must respond, announcing a general vicarious liability principle.282 
The Chilean civil code is significant because it greatly influenced many 
other Latin American legal systems and was either adopted entirely or used as 
a model in Colombia, Ecuador, Argentina, Paraguay, Venezuela, El Salvador, 
and Nicaragua.283 Article 54 states that people can be either legal or natural 
persons.284 Article 552 imputes the acts of agents as those of the corporation 
and Article 2314 states that people committing torts are liable to compensate 
 
 275 GRAZHDANSKII KODEKS ROSSIISKOI FEDERATSII [GK RF] [Civil Code] arts. 48–49 (Russ.), English 
translation available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=247776. 
 276 Id. art. 1068, English translation available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=247777. 
 277 FAFO, A COMPARATIVE SURVEY OF PRIVATE SECTOR LIABILITY FOR GRAVE VIOLATIONS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN NATIONAL JURISDICTIONS: NORWAY 20–21 (2006), http://www.fafo.no/liabilities/ 
Norway.pdf. 
 278 Id. at 20. 
 279 APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 16. 
 280 CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] (Spain). 
 281 Id. art. 35. 
 282 Id. arts. 1902–03. 
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the victim.285 Thus, reading Articles 552 and 2314 in pari materia, vicarious 
liability is established. 
The Brazilian civil code has been called the “greatest monument to legal 
thought and codification in Latin America.”286 Article 45 gives corporations 
legal existence and personality when they register.287 Article 932 provides the 
liability for employers for torts committed by agents and employees.288 
Although this is by no means a complete treatment of every national civil 
legal system, it stands as a proper representation of the treatment of 
corporations in the civil law tradition. To provide a final justification for the 
general principle, the European Group on Tort Law (“European Group”) sheds 
some light in its 2005 publication of the Principles of European Tort Law.289 
Article 4:202 of these principles provides for what the European Group calls 
enterprise liability.290 This article imposes liability on those using “auxiliaries” 
(the European Group’s term for agents or employees) for the harm caused by 
those auxiliaries.291 Moreover, Article 6:102 expressly provides for liability 
when damage is caused by an auxiliary acting “within the scope of their 
functions.”292 Thus, as the European Group and the previous investigation of 
national civil codes reveals, the civil law tradition embraces the general 
principles of tort liability for corporations by giving them legal personality and 
holding them liable through the vehicle of vicarious liability. 
D. Theological Legal Systems 
1. Jewish Law 
Jewish law, or Halakha, is sparse on its treatment of legal entities and 
corporations.293 Multiple perspectives for analyzing the modern corporate 
 
 285 Id. arts. 552, 2314. 
 286 APPLE & DEYLING, supra note 261, at 18 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 287 CÓDIGO CIVIL [C.C.] art. 45 (Braz.). 
 288 Id. art. 932. 
 289 See Bernhard A. Koch, The “European Group on Tort Law” and Its “Principles of European Tort 
Law,” 53 AM. J. COMP. L. 189, 194 (2005). 
 290 EUR. GRP. ON TORT LAW, PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW art. 4:202 (2005), available at 
http://civil.udg.edu/php/biblioteca/items/283/PETL.pdf. 
 291 Id. 
 292 Id. art. 6:102. 
 293 See Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business Structures: The 
Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1685, 1691 (1997). 
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entity have been developed by Jewish law scholars.294 The perspective most 
similar to the secular concept of corporations is called the Halakhic entity 
approach.295 Under this perspective, Jewish law recognizes the corporations as 
the owner of corporate assets, and thus a separate entity from the shareholders 
just as secular law does.296 
In the area of tort law, Halakha generally does not recognize the principle 
of vicarious liability.297 Yet, two important points mitigate the potential 
evisceration of a general principle that would hold corporations liable for their 
torts. First, in an investigation to discover a general principle, it does not have 
to be recognized by all nations “so long as there is evidence that is applied by a 
representative majority which includes the principal legal systems of the 
world.”298 Thus, the absence of this norm in Halakhic tradition does not 
immediately deprive the world of a general principle of corporate tort liability. 
Second, Jewish law recognizes the doctrine of dina de’malkhuta dina, or “the 
law of the land is the law.”299 Thus, in the nations of the world that would hold 
a corporation liable, such as the common law or civil law traditions, Jewish 
law would allow this imposition, although not provided for in Halakha. 
2. Islamic Law 
Islamic, or Sharia, law designates rules and regulations governing the lives 
of the practitioners of Islam.300 Its influence spread far beyond its birthplace in 
the Arabian peninsula and Lower Mesopotamia.301 As the Arab empire spread, 
Sharia law spread to Spain and Central Asia.302 Before the Islamic Revolution 
in Iran in 1979, the only country with a completely Islamic legal system was 
Saudi Arabia.303 After 1979, Iran and Sudan replaced “Western style laws with 
an Islamic legal system” and, to a lesser degree, Libya and Pakistan as well.304 
 
 294 Id. at 1695–97. 
 295 Id. at 1738. 
 296 Id. at 1738–39. 
 297 Id. at 1779. 
 298 De Wet, supra note 175, at 187. 
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(Atl. Publishers & Distrib. first Indian reprt. 2005) (2004). 
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 303 JAMILA HUSSAIN, ISLAMIC LAW AND SOCIETY: AN INTRODUCTION 24 (1999). 
 304 Id. 
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Sharia law has primary sources in the Quran and Sunnah and also recognizes 
secondary sources in “the interpretations and opinions of the learned jurists.”305 
In the commercial sphere, the goal of the law of Islam is not to inhibit fair 
trade and commerce, but “to allow people to earn their living in a fair and 
profitable way without exploitation of others.”306 Sharia originally did not 
recognize the existence of the juridical entity that is a corporation, and the 
concept that a partnership would exist as an entity separate from its partners 
developed only recently as a function of Western influence.307 Although 
assuming a type of legal “capability,” or dhimma, this capability does not 
endow Islamic corporations with a liability shield as seen in the West.308 
Moreover, Sharia expounds the rule of strict liability as the “bedrock” of 
judicial actions under Islamic tort law such that only the tortfeasor is liable for 
a particular tort action.309 
Today, the idea of juristic personality has been recognized by most of the 
Islamic countries in the Middle East, including those who base regulation on 
Sharia rather than Western law, such as Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab 
Emirates, Oman, and Qatar.310 Yet, in the field of vicarious tort liability, the 
scholars seem to be divided. Some suggest that respondeat superior has no 
place in Islamic law according to the principle of strict liability for responsible 
tortfeasors.311 Others use the term fiqh “al-‘āqilah” to apply to those people 
(“employers”) who can bear the responsibility of diyah (“blood-money”) on 
the employee’s behalf.312 
This latter concept of fiqh “al-‘āqilah” is similar to that seen in many 
common and civil law traditions, which impute the act of the employee “as if 
the employer caused the loss or damage himself.”313 Thus, there is no 
theoretical obstacle to the imposition of tort liability on a corporate entity in 
Islamic law. Yet, this conclusion may not have fully solidified. The concept of 
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 307 Nabil Saleh, Arab International Corporations: The Impact of the Shari‘a, 8 ARAB L.Q. 179, 180 
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a juridical entity was not in the writings of classical Islamic scholars314 and is 
developing as a result of Western influence.315 Moreover, the idea of vicarious 
liability may have been previously rejected, but is now receiving scholarship 
and validity from Islamic theorists.316 Thus, although the precise recognition of 
corporate tort liability is unclear in Islam, it appears there are no significant 
barriers to its development. 
Of the systems and national legal structures analyzed, agency and vicarious 
liability are common themes. Returning to the United States, in the modern era 
of corporate tort liability under the ATS, the theory of aiding and abetting or 
complicity in human rights abuses was the primary cause of action against 
corporations.317 Yet, this concept is unnecessary and its controversy moot if 
corporations cannot be held liable under the ATS as a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction.318 Yet, as this discussion concludes, corporate civil liability is a 
general principle of international law, and this doctrine, as applied to Kiobel, 
should not prevent the imposition of aiding and abetting liability for 
international law violations—assuming that aiding and abetting liability is a 
sufficiently specified or recognized norm of the law of nations.319 
V. APPLICATION OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES TO KIOBEL 
In this Part, this Comment first looks to the panel majority’s treatment of 
general principles and its misplaced reliance on the Restatement (Third) of the 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States. Next, it looks to the concurring 
opinion to show that, although Judge Leval followed a method similar to that 
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of application of general principles, he nevertheless ignored this important 
source. Third, this Comment analyzes the full bench of the Second Circuit’s 
denial of rehearing en banc and deals primarily with Chief Judge Jacobs’s 
arguments and how they could be remedied by the use of general principles. 
This Comment then applies the above-determined general principle and 
suggests how the Supreme Court may have alluded to and endorsed its use. 
Finally, this Comment will look at the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in 
Kiobel. 
A. Majority Opinion Analysis 
The majority’s classification of the use of “general principles” as being a 
matter of domestic law320 is a mischaracterization for two reasons. First, the 
majority cites to Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.321 for the concept that 
customary international law does not view “universally proscribed” conduct 
under domestic law as relevant for purposes of determining what customary 
international law truly is.322 This is not an inaccurate statement of the law in 
that general principles are not a consideration in the custom inquiry. Yet, this 
phrasing in Flores confuses and conflates two separate sources of international 
law. Whereas custom looks to the norms and mores to which states have 
abided in their relations inter se,323 the formulation “general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations” is an implicit rejection of the necessity to look 
to the relations among the states. If general principles were to somehow be 
derived from the actions of states in their interactions with each other, then it 
stands to reason that the general principles, as outlined in the ICJ Statute, 
would have referred to international law, as the statute expressly did when it 
established international custom as a source.324 Thus, although the court in 
Flores was correct in saying that the investigation into custom does not 
consider general principles relevant,325 this does not support the idea that 
general principles cannot act as their own source in providing independent 
rules of decision and scope of liability determinations. Adding to this, a 
 
 320 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 141 n.43 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 
472 (2011). 
 321 Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 414 F.3d 233 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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(quoting Flores, 414 F.3d at 249). 
 323 See IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 324 See ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38. 
 325 Flores, 414 F.3d at 252. 
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hierarchy between custom, treaty, and general principles was explicitly 
rejected in the drafting of Article 38.326 
Second, the Second Circuit also relied upon the Restatement (Third) of 
Foreign Relations Law of the United States,327 which actually undermines their 
ultimate conclusion on the value of general principles to international law. 
Section 102(4) of the Restatement states: “General principles common to the 
major legal systems, even if not incorporated or reflected in customary law or 
international agreement, may be invoked as supplementary rules of 
international law as appropriate.”328 Even the comment to which the majority 
cited and on which it relied in rejecting general principles admits that they can 
be “resorted to for developing international law interstitially in special 
circumstances.”329 
Thus, it is appropriate to argue that corporate liability for international law 
violations is a special circumstance warranting the invocation of those general 
principles that the world’s major legal systems have recognized. To this point, 
comment (l) to § 102 of the Restatement lists specific rules that have been 
drawn from Article 38(c) of the ICJ Statute, namely, “rules relating to the 
administration of justice, such as the rule that no one may be judge in his own 
cause; res judicata; and rules of fair procedure generally.”330 It is logical that 
these would not be evidenced by customary international law. Disallowing a 
person “to be judge in his own cause” is not a principle of the type that would 
ordinarily be embodied in the sources of custom as evidenced by the practice 
of states inter se. It is one that follows from the basic concepts of law and its 
practical operation. These examples evidence the function of general principles 
as filling gaps or lacunae in international law.331 
Moreover, the same comment goes on to say that general principles can 
also provide “‘rules of reason’ of a general character, such as acquiescence and 
estoppel, the principle that rights must not be abused, and the obligation to 
repair a wrong.”332 The Restatement’s inclusion of principles such as that 
 
 326 Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 782. 
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“rights must not be abused” and an “obligation to repair a wrong”333 is a direct 
parallel with the one of the purposes of tort liability—“to restore injured 
parties to their original condition . . . by compensating them for their injury; 
and . . . to vindicate individual rights of redress.”334 Thus, the Restatement 
seems to provide an argument for the use of general principles to derive 
corporate liability under the ATS, undermining the majority’s reliance on one 
sentence in the comment to Section 102. 
B. Concurring Opinion Analysis 
The key fault with the concurring opinion is its position on the role and 
power of domestic law in holding corporations liable for civil damages. Judge 
Leval repeatedly maintained a position evidenced by the argument that “[t]he 
position of international law on whether civil liability should be imposed for 
violations of its norms is that international law takes no position and leaves 
that question to each nation to resolve.”335 First, it stands to note that he 
provided no citation or support for this proposition. He merely moved from a 
lacuna in the scope of international law to the application of domestic law. In 
doing so, he skipped right over the very concept that would resolve his conflict 
and put him more in line with the correct statement of international law, 
namely the application of general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations. 
The position for which Judge Leval advocated is not dissimilar to the 
application of general principles. He used a concept that is well known in U.S. 
law to fill the gap in international law concerning the liability of corporations 
for their torts committed against aliens. This does not significantly differ from 
taking the general principle seen in the world’s major legal systems, including 
the United States, and applying it here to uphold corporate liability. The use of 
general principles recognizes the authority of the ICJ Statute and looks to 
municipal law to determine what the law is on the issue. Although his assertion 
is correct that generally international law is indifferent as to the enforcement of 
its rules, Judge Leval applied only the domestic principles of the United States, 
which “draws no distinction in its laws between violators who are natural 
persons and corporations.”336 
 
 333 Id. 
 334 SCHWARTZ ET AL., supra note 241, at 1–2. 
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C. Denial of Rehearing 
In February 2011, the Second Circuit denied rehearing in Kiobel.337 Three 
separate opinions were filed: a dissent from Judge Leval and concurring 
opinions from Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge Cabranes (the author of the 
Kiobel panel majority opinion).338 Whereas Judge Cabranes filed just a 
paragraph, mostly supporting the Kiobel panel reasoning and rejecting claims 
that it was motivated by a policy agenda,339 Chief Judge Jacobs and Judge 
Leval filed heated opinions, directly addressing each other’s arguments. 
Because the views posited in these arguments have erroneous propositions and 
this case presents an opportunity to use general principles, this Comment 
analyzes the denial opinions, primarily Jacobs’s concurrence. 
Unlike the opinion of the Kiobel panel, Chief Judge Jacobs’s concurring 
opinion to the denial of a rehearing is full of foreign policy considerations.340 
Generally, he posited that because “foreign companies are creatures of other 
states” and are “often engines of their national economies,” then American 
courts are overreaching in ATS litigation by exerting the “power to bring to 
court transnational corporations of other counties . . . and to beggar them by 
rendering their assets into compensatory damages, punitive damages, and 
(American) legal fees,” thus undermining comity.341 He then referred to 
statements made by South African President Thabo Mbeki characterizing the 
Khulumani decision as “judicial imperialism.”342 He closed his policy 
considerations by arguing that there is no danger of other states protecting their 
corporations from judicial action in their home state because “no one would 
protect any enemy of all mankind.”343 
 
 337 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 642 F.3d 268 (2d Cir. 2011). A request for a rehearing en banc 
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Chief Judge Jacobs’s policy concerns are misguided and, even those that 
are not, can be remedied by means significantly less severe than the result in 
Kiobel provides. Kiobel’s bright-line prohibition on actions against 
corporations under the ATS itself is “seizing the initiative to make foreign and 
domestic policy”344 by restricting access to U.S. courts under an erroneous use 
of international law, namely the rejection of general principles. Moreover, 
many of his concerns about “judicial imperialism” are applicable to ATS 
actions against natural persons as well as corporations.345 Yet, he does not call 
for the repeal of the ATS to thwart this concern. 
Especially striking is Chief Judge Jacobs’s naïveté in suggesting that 
foreign states have no interest in protecting corporations that are perpetrating 
international law violations. This is striking because of Jacobs’s recognition 
that actions may be against corporations that are the “engines of their national 
economies.”346 If the engine of a state’s economy is in danger because of suits 
arising from its complicity in human rights violations, that state has a 
substantial interest in not bringing them to justice. This is one of the main 
advantages of the ATS’s use of the civil suit mechanism: the victims (or their 
survivors) can bring the claims themselves in the face of a potentially reluctant 
state prosecutor. Also not mentioned by Jacobs is an alternative to the bright-
line prohibition found in the doctrine of forum non conveniens, which could 
easily deal with issues of American versus foreign adjudication. 
Chief Judge Jacobs also argued contradictorily by stating both that Kiobel 
is “of no big consequence”347 and also that Kiobel “matters.”348 He stated first 
that it is unimportant because the court’s earlier holding in Talisman—wherein 
the court adopted the purposive standard for aiding and abetting liability—has 
foreclosed ATS suits against corporations to the “vanishing point.”349 On the 
other hand, he argued that Kiobel is important because, without it, “plaintiffs 
would be able to plead around Talisman in a way that (notwithstanding Bell 
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly and Ashcroft v. Iqbal) would delay dismissal.”350 Both 
of these contentions are vulnerable to criticism. 
 
 344 Id. at 273 (Leval, J., dissenting). 
 345 See id. at 276. 
 346 Id. at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring). 
 347 Id. 
 348 Id. at 271. 
 349 Id. 
 350 Id. (citations omitted). 
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Judge Leval rightly pointed out the “strange logic” of Jacobs’s use of 
Talisman.351 If Talisman’s standard will dismiss all but the most heinous and 
factually supported ATS claims, then Kiobel’s only role is to exonerate all but 
the most heinous and factually supported ATS claims.352 Responding to the 
contrary argument for Kiobel’s importance, his terse dismissal of the pleading 
barrier provided by Iqbal is inapposite. Undoubtedly, Iqbal made the motion to 
dismiss stage more difficult for plaintiffs to surpass by requiring a plausible 
claim for relief and even more so in litigation whose evidence and facts span 
multiple nations.353 Chief Judge Jacobs’s terse dismissal of the weight and 
difficulty in pleading provided by Iqbal and Twombly does not give enough 
credit to this initial barrier. 
Chief Judge Jacobs also raised another issue that could be easily solved by 
the use and application of general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations. He wrote: “The imposition of liability on corporations, moreover, 
raises vexed questions. What employee actions can be imputed to the 
corporation? What about piercing the corporate veil? . . . Punitive damages is a 
peculiar feature of American law; can they be exacted?”354 Questions such as 
these beg for the use of general principles because they are unlikely to be 
evidenced by custom. General principles fill the lacunae of international law 
where the domestic legal systems of the world have already come to a 
consensus. Questions about scope of actions, veil piercing, and punitive 
damages awards could be easily solved by looking to the legal systems of the 
world as evidence of an accepted treatment. 
D. Certiorari Granted 
On October 17, 2011, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Kiobel.355 
Because of the Second Circuit’s sua sponte decision to consider the corporate 
liability issue of as a matter of subject matter jurisdiction, the Supreme Court 
certified a second question in its grant, namely, “[w]hether the issue of 
corporate civil tort liability under the Alien Tort Statute (‘ATS’), 28 U.S.C. 
 
 351 Id. at 276 (Leval, J., dissenting). 
 352 Id. at 275–76 (“In other words, the defendants who secure exoneration by the operation of the 
majority’s rule are the ones who acted most heinously, such as slave traders, pirates, and mercenaries who 
contract to torture and carry out genocides.”). 
 353 Leslie A. Gordon, Convoluted in Courts: For Federal Plaintiffs, Twombly and Iqbal Still Present a 
Catch-22, A.B.A. J., Jan. 2011, at 16, 16.  
 354 Id. at 270 (Jacobs, C.J., concurring). 
 355 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
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§ 1350, is a merits question . . . or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.”356 
This Comment will briefly discuss the significance of this issue. 
It is important to consider the consequences of the Court’s decision on this 
issue. If the question of whether a corporation can be liable under the ATS is a 
question of subject matter jurisdiction, then the Second Circuit committed no 
error by raising it sua sponte. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(h)(3), 
a court must dismiss an action if it “at any time” determines that it lacks 
subject matter jurisdiction.357 If, however, the Court finds that the corporate 
liability issue is a merits question, then it was improper for the Second Circuit 
to raise the issue and dismiss on that basis. 
Most recently, the Court looked at whether the extraterritorial application 
of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act was an issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction in Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.358 Writing for the 
majority, Justice Scalia stated, “to ask what conduct § 10(b) reaches is to ask 
what conduct § 10(b) prohibits, which is a merits question.”359 Thus, the Court 
held that this issue was a merits question. In this case, the Court held that the 
jurisdictional statute (§ 78aa) supporting the substantive cause of action 
(§ 10(b)) allowed for jurisdiction.360 
Similarly, in Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp.,361 the Court looked at Title VII’s 
requirements to determine whether the fact that an employer did not meet the 
statutory definition of an “employer” was an issue of subject matter 
jurisdiction.362 Yet, like in Morrison, the term “employee” does not appear in 
the actual jurisdiction-granting provision of Title VII, but in a substantive 
definitional provision.363 The Court expressed concern about “drive-by 
jurisdictional rulings”364 wherein “[j]udicial opinions . . . often obscure the 
 
 356 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at i, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (No. 10-1491); see also Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum, SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/kiobel-v-royal-dutch-
petroleum-et-al (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). For an excellent treatment of the jurisdictional question in Kiobel, 
see generally Kedar Bhatia, Comment, Reconsidering the Purely Jurisdictional View of the Alien Tort Statute, 
27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. (forthcoming 2013). 
 357 FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3). 
 358 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
 359 Id. at 2877. 
 360 Id.; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 10(b), 78aa (Supp. IV 2010). 
 361 Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006). 
 362 Id. at 504–07. 
 363 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (“Each United States district court . . . shall have jurisdiction of actions 
brought under this subchapter.”). 
 364 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 511 (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 91 (1998)) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
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issue by stating that the court is dismissing for lack of jurisdiction when some 
threshold fact has not been established, without explicitly considering whether 
the dismissal should be for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or for failure to 
state a claim.”365 
Considering Morrison and Arbaugh, Kiobel presents a similar situation. In 
Kiobel, the Second Circuit considered whether a corporate defendant could be 
subject to suit under the ATS’s jurisdictional support.366 The Second Circuit 
looked to a jurisdictional statute, but considered a subject and issue not 
mentioned within the statutory language, namely whether a particular 
defendant can be sued. In Morrison, the Court looked to where someone could 
be sued and held that it was a merits question.367 The issue of where someone 
could be sued was not mentioned in the jurisdiction-granting statute.368 In 
Arbaugh, the Court considered whether someone fit a substantive definitional 
provision and held that it was a merits question.369 The specific term whose 
definition was not met (“employer”) was not mentioned in the jurisdiction-
granting statute.370 And here, in Kiobel, the Court will consider whether a 
particular entity is within the reach of the jurisdiction-granting statute.371 And, 
like in the two cases above, the defendant (or the persons capable of being a 
defendant) is not mentioned in the jurisdiction-granting statute (the ATS). It 
seems that Morrison and Arbaugh are directly applicable and this issue is one 
of merits, not one of jurisdiction. 
Yet, this should not be the kill switch on the Court’s analysis. Even though 
in Morrison the majority found that the extraterritorial reach of § 10(b) was a 
merits question, the Court stated that because none of the lower courts’ 
analyses relied on the mistake of whether the issue was jurisdictional or went 
to the merits, a remand on this issue was unnecessary.372 The Court then 
continued to consider whether § 10(b) was indeed extraterritorial.373 Because a 
“remand would only require a new Rule 12(b)(6) label for the same Rule 
 
 365 Id. (quoting Da Silva v. Kinsho Int’l Corp., 229 F.3d 358, 361 (2d Cir. 2000)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
 366 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 117 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring), cert. 
granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
 367 Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010). 
 368 See 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2006). 
 369 Arbaugh, 546 U.S. at 516. 
 370 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(3) (2006). 
 371 See Petition for Writ of Certiorari, at i, Kiobel, 132 S. Ct. 472 (No. 10-1491). 
 372 Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877. 
 373 Id. 
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12(b)(1) conclusion,”374 the Court should still consider whether corporations 
are shielded from ATS liability, regardless of the Court’s conclusion on the 
subject matter jurisdiction versus merits question. 
E. Application of the General Principle 
After investigating the world’s legal systems, looking to the Kiobel 
opinions, and recognizing their underlying error by ignoring general principles 
of law, the application of this general principle that corporations can be held 
liable for their perpetration and furtherance of tortious injury is simple. The 
ATS claims against RDPC should be allowed to go forward, at least to a 
factual inquiry of sufficiency of the pleadings under Iqbal. Judge Leval, while 
vehemently dissenting against the majority reasoning, found these pleadings to 
be insufficient under this test.375 The fact that there was sufficient ground to 
dismiss all of the Nigerian plaintiffs’ claims for insufficient pleadings 
increases the curiosity of the broad and unexpected majority holding on an 
unbriefed issue. 
Dismissing this case on the jurisdictional ATS issue was against the weight 
of authority of both the Second Circuit and other courts. Although the majority 
is correct that unresolved issues “lurk[ing] in the record . . . are not to be 
considered as having been so decided as to constitute precedents,”376 the 
weight of authority which has either assumed that corporate ATS liability is 
available or allowed the suit to go forward without deciding is unquestionably 
persuasive.377 Moreover, Kiobel creates a direct circuit split with the Eleventh 
Circuit.378 In light of all this authority, the reasoning behind the majority’s 
 
 374 Id. 
 375 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 188–96 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., concurring), 
cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
 376 Webster v. Fall, 266 U.S. 507, 511 (1925). 
 377 See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 261 n.12 (2d Cir. 
2009) (assuming without deciding corporate liability); Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 
282–83 (2d Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring) (declining to decide the issue because it was not raised by 
the defendant); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 953–54 (9th Cir. 2002) (allowing claims for forced labor, 
murder, and rape without determining state action); Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp. 2d 
86, 105–08 (D.D.C. 2003) (dismissing claims for aiding and abetting terrorism due to lack of intent); 
Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 256 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (finding that plaintiffs stated a 
“color of law” requirement sufficient to sustain claims under the ATS). 
 378 See Romero v. Drummond Co., 552 F.3d 1303, 1315 (11th Cir. 2008). Since Kiobel’s decision, the 
circuit split has deepened. See Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 15 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e join 
the Eleventh Circuit in holding that neither the text, history, nor purpose of the ATS supports corporate 
immunity for torts based on heinous conduct allegedly committed by its agents in violation of the law of 
BANKS GALLEYS PROOFS.1 6/12/2012 8:13 AM 
2012] CORPORATE LIABILITY UNDER THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE 273 
reluctance to utilize general principles to resolve this question in favor of the 
weight of assumptions, suppositions, and an opposite holding is baffling. 
Adding to the force of this conclusion, the use of general principles should 
meet the strictures of the Supreme Court’s test in Sosa. Sosa’s requirement that 
“any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a norm of 
international character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we have 
recognized” allows for the acceptance of a general principle.379 General 
principles are “norm[s] of international character” to the extent that they are 
one of the three principal sources of international law, as outlined in the ICJ 
Statute.380 The objective search for recognition and precise definition of the 
general principle should meet the specificity requirement of the holding as 
well. Thus, the Supreme Court may have already hinted at and subtly endorsed 
the solution to the Kiobel problem, which the Second Circuit so casually 
rejected.381 
CONCLUSION 
A. Implications of Kiobel 
The immediate effect of the Second Circuit’s decision is apparent: 
corporations will not be held liable for their torts in violation of the law of 
nations. Shortly after this decision was written, but before filing, the U.S. 
District Court for the Central District of California dismissed an ATS suit on 
the same grounds as Kiobel.382 In this opinion, the district court undertook an 
extensive review of the justifications for previous impositions of corporate 
liability including logical extensions and stare decisis arguments.383 Just like 
the majority in Kiobel, the Central District of California dismissed the use of 
general principles in a footnote.384 
 
nations.”); Flomo v. Firestone Natural Rubber Co., 643 F.3d 1013, 1021 (7th Cir. 2011) (Posner, J.) (holding 
that “corporate liability is possible under the Alien Tort Statute”). 
 379 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (emphasis added). 
 380 Id. at 725; see also ICJ Statute, supra note 14, art. 38(1). 
 381 See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 141 n.43 (2d Cir. 2010) (Leval, J., 
concurring), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011). 
 382 Doe I v. Nestle, S.A., 748 F. Supp. 2d 1057, 1143–44 (C.D. Cal. 2010). 
 383 Id. at 1130–33. 
 384 Id. at 1144 n.70. 
BANKS GALLEYS PROOFS.1 6/12/2012 8:13 AM 
274 EMORY INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26 
Reading that opinion together with the Second Circuit’s Kiobel decision, 
the two are strikingly similar. Yet, neither provides a sufficient basis to refute 
one of Judge Leval’s arguments in his concurring opinion. Judge Leval argued 
that the remedy afforded by the ATS is not one that was handed down by 
international law, but was the judgment of Congress addressing a perceived 
need for a remedial measure for violations of international law cognizable at 
the time of its passage.385 As such, a judgment of Congress is susceptible to 
judicial interpretation in the face of conflict and ambiguity. Obviously, 
Congress did not speak to jurisdictional requirements concerning legal entities 
explicitly or implicitly in the statute. Thus, it is entirely consistent with U.S. 
jurisprudential practice to hold corporations liable. 
The Kiobel majority extols their previous investigations of customary 
international law as proof that they have engaged in the same analysis to 
determine the scope of liability under international law.386 Yet, the majority’s 
reliance on their decision in Kadic is slightly mischaracterized.387 Although 
they are correct that they looked to customary international law to determine 
whether non-state actors could be individually liable for international law 
violations, they did so exclusively in relation to the particular substantive norm 
attempting to be established.388 They did not make a blanket statement that 
individual actors could or could not be liable for international law violations as 
a bright-line rule. Thus, it is incorrect to state that their analysis in Kiobel—
wherein they did wholly deny corporate liability with no relation to any 
particular substantive norm—follows necessarily from their analysis in Kadic. 
Moreover, the majority overstates the clarity of the Kadic analysis and 
holding. In that case, they held that “certain forms of conduct violate the law of 
nations whether undertaken by those acting under the auspices of a state or 
only as private individuals.”389 By limiting this holding to “certain forms of 
conduct,” this is a far cry from the establishment of an international norm 
holding individuals (natural persons) liable for their international law 
violations under the ATS. Thus, following another of Judge Leval’s arguments, 
 
 385 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 175 (Leval, J., concurring); see also Sosa, 504 U.S. at 725. 
 386 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128 (“Likewise, in Kadic v. Karadzić, . . . international law provided the rules by 
which the court decided whether certain conduct violated the law of nations when committed by non-state 
actors.”) (citation omitted). 
 387 In Kadic, the Second Circuit held that some specific violations of international law were cognizable 
and recognized under the court’s ATS jurisdiction whether committed by states or individuals. See supra 
Part I. 
 388 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 232, 241–44 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 389 Id. at 239. 
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it seems that this limited holding that is far from clear or bright line cannot 
stand for the proposition that individual liability for those not acting under the 
auspices or color of state is a recognized norm of the community of nations. If 
the majority cannot justify this foundational premise of ATS liability, then it 
seems inapposite for them to extend it to juridical entities. 
The decision also implicates procedural barriers. The Supreme Court 
rejected the complaint in Ashcroft v. Iqbal for failure to state a “plausible” 
claim for relief against the Attorney General for discrimination infringing on 
constitutional protections.390 This substantially limited complainants’ access to 
the tools of discovery to attempt to find evidence of a notoriously difficult-to-
prove claim: discrimination. In the post-Kiobel world, the ability of an ATS 
litigant to get to discovery has been significantly curtailed. As in Iqbal—and 
its predecessor, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly—establishing a “plausible” 
claim, such as discrimination, anti-competitive practices, or purposeful 
provision of aid and resources in furtherance of human rights abuses, against 
the individuals in charge of entities that are as complicated as the U.S. 
government and most transnational corporations, has now become even more 
difficult.391 
Considering the implications of this decision, further questions arise: What 
effect would the opposite result have yielded? How could the Second Circuit 
have perhaps come to the same ultimate conclusion without completely 
abandoning any form of corporate liability under the ATS? The answers to 
these questions and their impact on the current state of ATS litigation will be 
discussed next. 
B. Alternative Solutions 
The decision in Kiobel is the most extreme of any solution that the Second 
Circuit could have contemplated. They decided the matter without any specific 
briefing from the parties on the matter of corporate liability and only a cursory 
mention of the issue occurring late and covering barely two pages of RDPC’s 
brief.392 This Comment proceeds to consider the alternative means by which 
 
 390 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950–51 (2009). Iqbal stands as the current case law on the 
specificity required in complaints to survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. Gordon, 
supra note 353, at 16. 
 391 See Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1952–53; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). 
 392 See Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 30–31, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 
111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (Nos. 06-4800-cv, 06-4876-cv). 
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the court could have concluded this case with varying degrees of impact on the 
state of ATS litigation. 
Most obviously, the court simply could have dismissed on insufficiency of 
the pleadings. This is the view adopted by the concurring opinion.393 
Considering the fact that this was not part of the question certified for 
interlocutory appeal by Judge Wood from the Southern District of New 
York,394 it may seem inappropriate for the appellate court to engage in the 
factual inquiry. Yet, the concurrence also handles this argument. An order 
certifying questions for the appellate court focuses more on the order and not 
the question, as “it is the order that is appealable, and not the controlling 
question identified by the district court.”395 
Another alternative is to follow the approach and conclusions of the district 
court in this case by analyzing the particular and allegedly violated norms to 
determine whether they have the sufficient specificity in international law to be 
cognizable under the ATS. The district court held that wanton destruction of 
real and personal property, forced exile, and extrajudicial killing were not 
sufficiently defined; while also holding that torture, arbitrary detention, and 
crimes against humanity were.396 Just as easily and in a significantly less 
extreme manner, the Second Circuit could have examined international law to 
determine whether the violations alleged in the multiple counts of the 
complaint were actually “defined with a specificity comparable to the features 
of the 18th-century paradigms” recognized at the time of the ATS’s 
enactment.397 Instead of slamming the door shut on all forms of corporate 
liability, the court could have followed prior practice and looked to the 
substantive norms being alleged to decide the case. 
Alternatively, the court also could have cleared up the murky and 
contentious state of aiding and abetting corporate liability theories in the 
opinions of this circuit and others. Judge Leval contends that they should 
follow the purposeful standard as articulated in Talisman.398 This approach 
 
 393 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 188 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 394 Id. at 124 (majority opinion). 
 395 Id. at 191 n.52 (Leval, J., concurring) (quoting Cal. Pub. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 
86, 95 (2d Cir. 2004)). 
 396 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 464–68 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff’d in part, 
rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111, cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472. 
 397 Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004). 
 398 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 192–93 (Leval, J., concurring). 
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would affect only the second major holding of the majority.399 In Talisman, the 
majority primarily looked to Judge Katzmann’s concurrence in Khulumani400 
to determine whether the source of the standard for aiding and abetting liability 
should derive from domestic law or international law.401 With this approach, 
the Kiobel court’s first holding would go unaffected. 
This approach employed by Judge Katzmann and the Talisman majority, 
although not as detailed as the Kiobel discussion, is similar and pertinent to 
this case. Judge Katzmann wrote that the Second Circuit has repeatedly 
emphasized that “the scope of the [ATS’s] jurisdictional grant should be 
determined by reference to international law.”402 The first part of the 
majority’s reasoning does not deviate from this practice. The Kiobel majority 
cited to the exact quoted language above in coming to its first holding that 
international law itself governs the scope of international law as applied under 
the ATS’s jurisdictional requirement that courts look to the law of nations.403 
Thus, the court could then move to an analysis of the standard to be met in 
actions for aiding and abetting liability. Specifically, they could have more 
clearly defined whether the mens rea standard in these actions is knowledge 
that actions taken would further human rights violations or a purpose to do 
so.404 Although the knowledge standard has been evidenced in international 
tribunal proceedings,405 it is most likely that the court, like the concurring 
opinion, would follow the arguments of Judge Katzmann in Khulumani and 
Talisman and adopt the purposeful standard. This has an additional advantage 
to the critics of ATS litigation generally. 
The use of a higher standard of mens rea in complicity liability could stem 
the fears of some in the business community that the ATS intrudes too much in 
a corporation’s business activities and interactions with foreign entities. RDPC, 
arguing that private aiding and abetting liability should not be recognized in 
 
 399 This is the holding that ultimately provides the court’s conclusion—that corporations are not liable 
under the ATS. See supra Part II.B. 
 400 Judge Katzmann reasoned in his Khulumani concurrence that the source of the aiding and abetting 
liability standard derived from international law. Khulumani v. Barclay Nat’l Bank Ltd., 504 F.3d 254, 268 (2d 
Cir. 2007) (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 401 Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 402 Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 269 (Katzmann, J., concurring). 
 403 Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 128. 
 404 Compare Khulumani, 504 F.3d at 277 (Katzmann, J., concurring) (recommending purposeful 
standard), with Prosecutor v. Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, Judgement, ¶ 117 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 21, 2000) (adopting knowledge standard). 
 405 See Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, ¶ 117. 
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this case, implied this concern: “Blanket recognition of private liability for 
aiding and abetting or conspiracy would render all those who do business in 
foreign countries liable for the acts of those governments, so long as a plaintiff 
alleged some cooperation between the government and a private defendant.”406 
One scholar has noted the impact and flood of litigation that widespread 
recognition of an aiding and abetting liability standard would have on 
enforcement of labor rights in foreign countries.407 Thus, the use of the higher 
purposeful standard would stem the fears of unwarranted intrusion in corporate 
affairs by a multitude of plaintiffs’ claims from around the world. 
Yet another approach the Second Circuit could have employed in the 
Kiobel decision is similar to that of their decision in Kadic v. Karadžić. Kadic, 
although not as clear as the Kiobel majority made it seem, was an examination 
of whether private individuals not acting under color of state could be held 
liable for violations of international law under the ATS.408 The Kadic holding 
did not necessarily validate the bright-line use of the ATS in actions against 
private individuals, but instead held that “certain forms of conduct” violated 
international norms regardless of status as state or non-state actors.409 The 
Kadic court continued by looking to these “certain forms” such as genocide, 
war crimes, and other instances inflicting death, torture, and degrading 
treatment as relating to individual culpability for these actions.410 This raises 
an alternative treatment in that the court could specify which claims against 
corporations are sustainable under the ATS. This alternative would also clear 
up the fears, raised in Sosa, inherent in requiring the district courts to interpret 
international law to find a cognizable norm. Moreover, this investigation 
would be substantially aided by looking to general principles to ascertain what 
conduct is abhorred in the domestic law spheres of the world. This would be a 
more appropriate and balanced approach to the issue of corporate liability than 
making an extraordinarily wide-reaching holding on an unbriefed issue while 
quelling some of the practical difficulties that the ATS jurisprudence presents 
to the lower courts. 
The final and significantly broader ground upon which the Second Circuit 
could have ruled is that the court could have denied the availability of a cause 
 
 406 Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, supra note 392, at 17. 
 407 Wesley V. Carrington, Note, Corporate Liability for Violation of Labor Rights Under the Alien Tort 
Claims Act, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1381, 1414–15 (2009). 
 408 Kadic v. Karadžić, 70 F.3d 239 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 409 Id. at 239. 
 410 Id. at 241–44. 
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of action for aiding and abetting under the ATS entirely. Unquestionably this 
would require an overturning of precedent in the circuit.411 Yet, it would not 
conflict with mandatory authority from the Supreme Court, which has never 
reached the issue. Additionally, this solution is no more extreme than simply 
denying relief against a whole class of defendants as a matter of subject matter 
jurisdiction and was actually a conclusion of a Southern District of New York 
ruling post-Sosa: “[T]he [ATS] presently does not provide for aider and abettor 
liability, and this Court will not write it into the statute.”412 
Although the court could not have effectuated it, one more solution to this 
problem lurks in ATS litigation and is actually hinted at by the majority in 
Kiobel. The majority wrote, in conclusion, “[N]othing in this opinion limits or 
forecloses corporate liability other than the ATS—including the domestic 
statutes of other States—and nothing in this opinion limits or forecloses 
Congress from amending the ATS to bring corporate defendants within our 
jurisdiction.”413 From this, it is clear that a congressional mandate could bring 
corporations back within the scope of the ATS. This is not as unlikely a 
scenario as it may seem. Congress has previously codified at least one 
violation of international norms beyond the three recognized paradigms, which 
served as the basis of the Sosa decision—the Torture Victim Protection Act.414 
Yet, it is also clear that pro-corporate interest lobbying efforts would not sit 
quietly while Congress attempted to provide a means of possible worldwide 
corporate liability in U.S. courts. 
C. Best Alternative Solution and the Future of ATS Corporate Litigation 
The final conclusion of this Comment is that the best alternative method by 
which the Second Circuit could have resolved Kiobel—instead of erecting an 
artificial jurisdictional barrier—is the application of general principles of law 
recognized by the world’s legal systems. In fact, in a post-Kiobel case, the 
D.C. Circuit endorsed the application of general principles in its well-
researched and lengthy opinion in Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp.415 This 
conclusion does not run counter to either the United States’ practice of holding 
 
 411 See Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 258–59 (2d Cir. 2009). 
 412 In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 550 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
 413 Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 149 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 
(2011). 
 414 Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (codified as a note following 
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)). 
 415 Doe VIII v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 53–55 (D.C. Cir. 2011). 
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corporations liable for their torts, or with the world’s recognition that this 
liability exists and is in the best interest of protecting victims of tortious injury. 
Instead, the court has allowed for the possibilities presented by Judge Leval’s 
slippery slope.416 Although the results may not be as extreme as Leval posited, 
the potential for abuse of Kiobel’s conclusion is most certainly possible. The 
majority attempts to mitigate this consequence by pointing back to their 
contention that individuals in the corporate structure responsible for human 
rights abuses could be held liable.417 
Yet, the deterrent effect of this holding is quite weak considering the 
massive amount of discovery and litigation involved in suits against 
transnational corporations and the difficulty in having enough information to 
allege which exact officer or manager was responsible for authorizing an 
action leading to an international law violation at the motion to dismiss stage, 
notwithstanding the increasing difficulty of proving it later in the case. Adding 
to this difficulty is the fact that officers and directors change with some 
frequency in the corporate arena. The responsible defendant may be far 
removed from the corporation and information may no longer be available to 
prove the claim. Thus, the potential for abuse is not as mitigated as the 
majority would like to argue. 
The use of general principles to allow for corporate liability combined with 
the purposeful standard from Talisman leads to the best balancing of the forces 
at play in ATS litigation. The use of a higher mens rea standard stands as a 
substantial and fair barrier to curb the fears of the business community 
concerning unwarranted judicial interference in their foreign business dealings. 
Yet, for plaintiffs crossing the Talisman barrier with the most heinous of 
human rights and international law violations, the path to relief would remain 
open under this approach; whereas, under the Kiobel holding, these most 
terrible violations will go unpunished. 
Future litigation of this issue and others in U.S. courts’ determinations of 
international law must look to general principles as a source. As the worldwide 
trend in international law is toward increased protection of human rights, 
increasingly more secondary procedural and minor issues will arise.418 General 
 
 416 See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 149–50, 155–58 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 417 Id. at 149 (majority opinion). 
 418 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102, cmt. (l), 
at 28 (1987) (noting that general principles can be “resorted to for developing international law interstitially in 
special circumstances”). 
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principles of law can be the tool used by courts to accommodate the rise of 
these issues. Moreover, general principles were formulated to do just this,419 
and their importance will only increase in future suits under the United States’ 
“legal Lohengrin”—the Alien Tort Statute. For the United States—where a 
revolution in human rights litigation was sparked by Filartiga—to deny 
compensation to plaintiffs injured by the most heinous of international law 
violations because of legal incapacity of juridical entities is entirely 
inconsistent with general principles of law and deals a significant blow to the 
vindication of human rights in U.S. courts. 
TYLER G. BANKS∗ 
 
 419 Bassiouni, supra note 177, at 769. 
 ∗ Executive Managing Editor, Emory International Law Review; J.D. Candidate, Emory University 
School of Law (2012); B.S., Purdue University (2009). The Author would like to thank the late Professor 
David J. Bederman, as well as Professor Scott Sigman, Julia Blackburn, Benjamin R. Farley, and Matthew 
Nestrud for their instrumental help on this work. 
